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Abstract
It is often asserted that consumers purchasing automobiles or other goods and services un-
derweight the costs of gasoline or other "add-ons." We test this hypothesis in the US automobile
market by examining the e¤ects of time series variation in gasoline price expectations on the
prices and market shares of vehicles with di¤erent fuel economy ratings. When gas prices rise,
demand for high fuel economy vehicles increases, pushing up their relative prices. Market share
changes - increased production of high fuel economy vehicles and scrappage of low fuel economy
vehicles - attenuate these price changes. Intuitively, the less that equilibrium vehicle prices and
shares respond to changes in expected gasoline prices, the less that consumers appear to value
gasoline costs.
We estimate a nested logit discrete choice model using a remarkable dataset that includes
market shares, characteristics, expected usage, and transaction price microdata for all new and
used vehicles available between 1999 and 2008. To address simultaneity bias, we introduce a
new instrument for used vehicle market shares, based on the fact that gasoline prices cause
variation in new vehicle shares that then persists over time as the vehicles move through resale
markets. Our results show that US auto consumers are willing to pay just $0.61 to reduce
expected discounted gas expenditures by $1. We incorporate the estimated parameters into a
new discrete choice approach to behavioral welfare analysis, which suggests with caution that a
paternalistic energy e¢ ciency policy could generate welfare gains of $3.6 billion per year.
JEL Codes: D03, L62, Q41.
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1 Introduction
There is a growing body of evidence that consumers choosing between products may underweight,
relative to purchase prices, product costs that are less salient or accrue in the future. Consumers
on eBay, for example, are less elastic to shipping and handling charges than to the listed purchase
price (Hossain and Morgan 2006). Mutual fund investors appear to be less attentive to ongoing
management fees than to upfront payments (Barber, Odean, and Zheng 2005). Shoppers are less
elastic to sales taxes than to prices (Chetty, Looney, and Kroft 2009). Consumerstradeo¤s between
the purchase price and future energy costs of air conditioners imply relatively high discount rates
(Hausman 1979).1
Similarly, it is often asserted2 that vehiclesgasoline costs are not salient to automobile con-
sumers at the time of purchase, and that consumers thus do not fully account for these future costs
when choosing between vehicles. As a result, consumers choose lower fuel economy automobiles,
with higher resulting fuel expenditures, than they would in their private optimum. In 2007, the
median-income American family spent $2400 on gasoline, and American households spent $286
billion in total (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2007). Misoptimization over such a large expendi-
ture class could result in substantial welfare losses. The purported undervaluation of gasoline costs
would also help explain what Ja¤e and Stavins (1994) call the "Energy Paradox": that consumers
and rms have been remarkably slow to adopt apparently high-return energy e¢ cient technologies.3
Externalities related to national security and climate change would exacerbate the private wel-
fare losses from consumerspotential undervaluation of fuel economy. There has been substantial
debate over whether these externalities should be internalized through gasoline taxes or Corporate
1Hausman estimates that consumers implicitly use a discount rate of 25 percent per year when they trade of
purchase prices and future energy costs of new air conditioners. He concludes (p. 51), "Yet this nding of a high
individual discount rate does not surprise most economists. At least since Pigou, many economists have commented
on a "defective telescopic faculty." A simple fact emerges that in making decisions which involve discounting over
time, individuals behave in a manner which implies a much higher discount rate than can be explained in terms of
the opportunity cost of funds available in credit markets. Since this individual discount rate substantially exceeds
the social discount rate used in benet-cost calculations, the divergence might be narrowed by policies which lead to
purchases of more energy-e¢ cient equipment."
2See, for example, Greene (1998) and Parry, Walls, and Harrington (2007).
3Various explanations have been proposed for this apparent anomaly, including imperfect information, credit
constraints, principal-agent problems (Murtishaw and Sathaye 2006), some form of bounded rationality (DeCanio
1993), and that discount rates do not properly model hysteresis and irreversible investment under uncertainty (Hassett
and Metcalf 1993). Yet another explanation is that there may be no "Paradox" at all: analysts estimates of the
returns to investments that improve energy e¢ ciency may be overly optimistic (Metcalf and Hassett 1999).
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Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards (e.g. Bento, et al, 2009). Economists often argue that
gas taxes are preferable because they act both on the extensive margin, by encouraging consumers
to buy higher fuel economy vehicles, and on the intensive margin, by encouraging them to drive
vehicles less. CAFE standards, by contrast, only bind on the extensive margin.4 If consumers
undervalue future fuel costs when they choose between vehicles, however, their extensive margin
response to gasoline taxes would not be optimal, and if the undervaluation is su¢ cient, CAFE
standards might be preferred. Indeed, one of the leading economic arguments for CAFE and other
energy e¢ ciency standards is that they could increase welfare by forcing consumers to own more
energy e¢ cient durable goods, regardless of whether their choices indicate that they want them.5
A central problem in taking the paternalistic stance on fuel economy standards is the dearth
of evidence on whether automobile consumers actually are or are not misoptimizing. The rational
model provides our null hypothesis: that consumers are willing to pay one extra dollar in vehi-
cle purchase price to decrease the expected present value of future gasoline costs by one dollar.
Although many phrases could be used, for expositional purposes we will say that rejecting this
hypothesis is evidence that consumers "misvalue gasoline costs."6 This paper tests the null hypoth-
esis using extraordinary micro- and market-level data on the prices, quantities, characteristics, and
usage of all passenger vehicles in the United States between 1999 and 2008.
Our empirical test is based on the intuition that the increase in gasoline prices over the past
decade should increase the relative prices and market shares of high- vs. low-fuel economy vehicles.
Indeed, media reports and academic analyses have documented that as gasoline prices rise, the
market shares of new high fuel economy vehicles rise (Klier and Linn 2008), the scrappage of used
low fuel economy vehicles increases (Li, Timmins, and Von Haefen 2009), and the relative prices
of both new and used vehicles with low fuel economy drop (Busse, Knittel, and Zettelmeyer 2009).
The above null hypothesis, however, does more than predict that gasoline prices should a¤ect
4The higher fuel economy vehicles required under CAFE require less fuel to operate per mile, and thus consumers
actually have the incentive on the intensive margin to increase driving. This is often called the "rebound e¤ect."
5This "paternalistic" argument for fuel economy standards is discussed in the governments Regulatory Impact
Analysis of the new CAFE standards (NHTSA 2009, page 335) and is suggested by Fischer, Harrington, and Parry
(2007), Greene (1998), Greene, Patterson, Singh, and Li (2005), and Parry, Walls, and Harrington (2007), among
others. Some of these analyses do not necessarily advocate the position given the lack of empirical support for
misoptimization. Hausman and Joskow (1982) discuss this argument in the context of appliance energy e¢ ciency
standards.
6Related research might use di¤erent terms to describe undervaluation of gasoline costs, such as myopia, misop-
timization, inattention, shrouding, salience, high implicit discount rates, and naivete.
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relative demand for vehicles of di¤erent fuel economy ratings: it predicts how much demand should
be a¤ected. Finding that changes in relative prices and shares are smaller than predicted suggests
that consumers undervalue gasoline costs and fuel economy when they purchase vehicles.
In principle, consumersvaluation of fuel economy and future gasoline costs could be estimated
in a hedonic or discrete choice framework using variation in the prices and fuel economy ratings in
one cross section of vehicles. Since energy costs are a function of the products energy e¢ ciency and
of energy prices, however, this valuation can alternatively be estimated from time-series changes
in energy price expectations. We adopt this approach, using panel data on vehicle markets with
vehicle-specic xed e¤ects. This allows our estimator to be unbiased even if a vehicles fuel
economy is correlated with its unobserved characteristics.
As proposed by Kahn (1986)7, the panel approach is simplest if one assumes that neither new
vehicle supply nor used vehicle scrappage rates respond to gas prices. In this intuitive model, the
relative price of a used vehicle should decrease by one dollar for each one-dollar increase in the
relative present discounted value of expected future gasoline costs. Unfortunately, the observed
response of market shares to gas price changes biases that approach towards concluding that con-
sumers undervalue gasoline costs. Higher gas costs lead to a decrease in production of low fuel
economy new vehicles. The reduced supply in turn increases the prices of both these new vehicles
and used vehicles that are good substitutes. Similarly, production of high fuel economy vehicles
would go up, reducing the prices of new and used high MPG vehicles. The responsiveness of used
vehicle prices to gas costs would therefore be smaller than would be expected if quantities were
assumed to be xed. This responsiveness is further attenuated if scrappage of low fuel economy
vehicles increases with gas prices.
We account for vehicle quantities and substitution patterns using a discrete choice model of
vehicle demand, where consumersutility from owning a vehicle is allowed to depend separately on
discounted future gasoline costs and the purchase price. To account for unobserved heterogeneity
in consumerspreferences, we use a nested logit model. The benet of the nested logit specication
7Kilian and Sims (2006) and Sallee, West, and Fan (2009) build on Kahns (1986) fundamental approach. Other
work that examines how vehicle prices adjust in response to gasoline prices include Sawhill (2008), Langer and Miller
(2009), and Austin (2008). Verboven (1999) estimates the discount rates implied by di¤erences between the prices of
gasoline and diesel vehicles in Europe. Ohta and Griliches (1986) examine whether the 1970s gasoline price shocks
a¤ected consumersvaluations of vehicle characteristics.
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is that it gives a simple market-level relationship between equilibrium vehicle prices, market shares,
and gasoline costs while parsimoniously modeling substitution patterns across similar vehicles.
In estimating the demand equation that results from our model, we face the standard simul-
taneity problem that vehicle market shares (and prices) may be correlated with unobserved vehicle
characteristics. Accordingly, we instrument for market shares by exploiting the fact that the de-
mand for a new vehicle with low fuel economy is higher in years when gasoline prices are low. At
any time in the future, the quantity available of the (now used) vehicle produced in that year will
therefore be higher than the quantity of the same model produced in a model year when gasoline
prices were high. Crucially, this within-model variation in quantity of used vehicles should be inde-
pendent of unobserved product attributes. Our paper therefore introduces into the literature a new
instrument for automobile market shares or prices, based on the interaction of fuel economy with
the gasoline price in the model year in which the vehicle was produced. This may prove to be more
broadly useful as an alternative to the standard Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) instrumental
variables procedure.
We estimate the model with perhaps the largest collection of data ever used in the economics
literature on the automobile industry. From microdata on 57 million vehicle transactions at both
auto dealerships and auctions, we construct monthly average prices for all new and used passenger
vehicles available in the United States. From comprehensive vehicle registration data, we observe
the national-level market shares of each of these vehicles and match these to the price data using the
industrys serial numbers, called VINs. This is in turn matched to each vehicles fuel economy and
other characteristics. The vehicle-level data are supplemented by data on retail gasoline prices and
oil futures prices, from which we construct expected future gasoline costs, and the 25,000-household
National Household Travel Survey, covering vehicle ownership and vehicle-miles traveled.
We formulate our assumptions to conservatively bias us against nding that consumers under-
value gasoline costs. We nd, however, undervaluation for any plausible set of assumptions about
gasoline cost expectations, vehicle survival probabilities, vehicle-miles traveled, and other parame-
ters. We conservatively estimate that between 1999 and March 2008, American auto consumers
were willing to pay only sixty-one cents to reduce expected discounted gas expenditures by one
dollar.
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Under the assumption that our empirical results are driven by inattention to future gasoline
costs, we then compute the welfare implications of misoptimization. To carry this out, we ap-
ply the framework of Bernheim and Rangel (2009) and related analyses to introduce a new and
highly tractable approach to behavioral welfare analysis in a discrete choice setting. We analyze
a counterfactual "Behavioral Feebate" policy that imposes sales taxes that increase in a vehicles
expected future gasoline consumption by an amount such that consumers purchase their privately-
optimal vehicles. Given our parameter estimates and stylized modeling assumptions, the welfare
gains from such a policy are $15 per potential vehicle owner per year. Across approximately 240
million potential vehicle owners, this sums to $3.6 billion annually.
These ndings have implications in several domains. First, a cap-and-trade program to internal-
ize the marginal damages of carbon dioxide emissions would act on the automobile market through
an increase in gasoline prices. For a cap-and-trade or a comparable Pigouvian tax to achieve the
rst best requires that all consumers arrive at their own private optima given the new higher relative
prices of pollution-intensive goods. If automobile buyers undervalue future gasoline prices, other
sectors will have to abate more carbon to satisfy a carbon emissions cap, and the marginal cost
of abatement will be above the optimum and will not be equal across sectors. Through this logic,
our nding adds empirical justication for extending the discussion of tax salience (e.g. Finkelstein
(2009) and Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009)) into "environmental tax salience."
Second, understanding consumersdemand for fuel economy is central to analyzing the wel-
fare and prot implications of new products and regulatory changes in the automotive industry.
Analyses including Bento, et al, (2009), Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995, 2004), Goldberg (1995,
1998), Jacobsen (2008), and Nevo (2002) all use an estimate of consumersdemand for higher fuel
economy vehicles. Our analysis is complementary to this body of work in that it provides a careful
estimate of an essential demand parameter.
Third, evidence that consumers are inattentive to future product costs also has important
implications for how rms behave in equilibrium. "Myopic" or "unsophisticated" consumers, in
the sense of Gabaix and Laibson (2006) and Ellison (2005), may be one reason why rms set low
markups on base products such as credit card interest rates, razors, and printers and set high
markups for add-ons such as late fees, razor blades, and printer cartridges. Although automobile
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manufacturing rms do not sell gasoline (the "add-on"), a related model can be applied in this
industry, as the fuel economy embodied in a vehicle determines gasoline demand, and improving fuel
economy is costly. Furthermore, if gasoline costs are in essence a "shrouded attribute" in consumers
decisions, this reduces manufacturersability to exploit economies of scale in producing high fuel
economy vehicles and dulls their incentives to direct technological change toward reducing the cost
of such vehicles. This suggests additional channels through which regulations such as Corporate
Average Fuel Economy standards and fuel economy information labels can a¤ect consumer welfare.
The paper progresses as follows. In section 2, we provide an overview of how we conceptualize
this problem, making the connection between features of the economic problem and econometric
identication. In the third section, we formally set up consumersutility functions, and in section 4,
we present our estimation strategy. Section 5 presents the aggregate and consumer-level data that
we have gathered and devotes particular attention to the construction of a vehicles discounted
expected future gasoline costs. Section 6 presents our main results and an extensive series of
robustness checks. Section 7 presents the theory and results of the welfare calculation.. Section 8
concludes with a note of caution on whether this analysis should be used to advocate for paternalistic
energy e¢ ciency policies.
2 Conceptualizing the Problem
All else equal, an optimizing consumer should be willing to pay $1 more for a product that entails
$1 less in discounted future costs. The fundamental goal of this paper is to test whether observed
automobile market equilibria are consistent with this condition. Our test requires us to construct a
framework that predicts how gasoline price-induced demand shifts a¤ect equilibrium vehicle prices
and quantities, and then to compare the predictions to data. This section introduces the economic
intuition for our approach; our formal model is introduced in section 3. One key takeaway from
this section will be that both vehicle prices and market shares must be endogenized - a simpler
estimator that holds quantities xed would generate biased estimates.
A number of analyses have attempted to measure the importance of energy e¢ ciency in the
choice of energy using durable goods, in a long and active literature on "implicit discount rates."
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The most common identication strategy has been to exploit variation in the prices and energy
e¢ ciencies in a cross-section of products. Cross-sectional identication strategies were used in
seminal paper by Hausman (1979) and a number of later papers, including Espey and Nair (2005),
Dreyfus and Viscusi (1995), and Dubin (1992). In the discrete choice framework, conditional on
other product characteristics, a one dollar increase in purchase price should be associated with
the same decrease in market share as a one dollar increase in lifetime energy costs. In a hedonic
regression, a one dollar increase in energy costs should be associated with a one dollar decrease in
price.
For such an estimator to be unbiased, any unobserved characteristics must be uncorrelated with
energy e¢ ciency, and the functional form of any observed and correlated characteristics must be
correctly specied. With automobiles, this assumption is likely to be problematic. Fuel economy is
highly correlated with weight and horsepower, which enter the typical indirect utility function for
automobiles in characteristics space. While these variables are observable, the way in which they
enter the utility function could be mis-specied.8 Furthermore, fuel economy is a¤ected by styling
decisions that a¤ect wind resistance and may enter utility functions, as well as by features such as
air conditioners that increase a vehicles value. These features are in some cases di¢ cult to observe
or quantify. In a cross section, fuel economy is negatively correlated with price, which suggests that
low fuel economy vehicles may have more unobserved characteristics that increase utility.
The ability to look "within" the same vehicle over time as gasoline prices change obviates the
need to make assumptions about how the vehicles unobserved characteristics are correlated with
fuel economy. As a concrete example, consider comparing the price of a model year 2001 Honda
Civic in 2006 to a model year 2002 Honda Civic in 2007. If all else were equal other than gasoline
prices, the change in price of this 5 year old Civic from 2006 to 2007 would be the response to the
change in expected gas costs between the two years. An increase in gasoline prices should increase
its purchase price relative to a lower-fuel economy vehicle, and decrease its purchase price relative
to a higher-fuel economy vehicle. What we must do now is think through how much these relative
prices should change.
8At least since Atkinson and Halvorsen (1984), it has been pointed out that the high correlation between weight
and fuel economy makes it di¢ cult to estimate demand for fuel economy. In fact, cross sectional estimation of
automobile demand in characteristic space sometimes gives the "wrong" sign on fuel economy.
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We add some mathematical structure to provide intuition for the problem. The simple model
that follows will motivate the need for the formal discrete choice model that will be presented
beginning in the subsequent section. Consider a very simple world where consumers choose between
a vehicle and some outside option. A demand function is:
q =   p  G (1)
In this equation, q is the vehicles quantity,  is an intercept, p is the vehicles purchase price,
and G is the discounted gasoline costs over the vehicles lifetime, which we assume to be the same
for all consumers. The variable G will depend on a discount rate, future gas prices, fuel economy,
and the vehicles usage and scrappage probability over time, and we will later return to these issues
in great detail. We allow consumers to value purchase price and gas costs unequally. We can also
re-arrange this equation to get equilibrium price on the left-hand side:
p =
1

( G+   q) (2)
Assume for the next few paragraphs that the vehicles quantity q is constant. Equation (3)
shows that if  = , as in our null hypothesis, a one dollar increase in G would cause a one dollar
decrease in p. Intuitively, if quantity is constant, the same consumer, with the same willingness to
pay, sets the price. To keep this consumer indi¤erent between the vehicle and the most attractive
outside option, the overall product cost p+G must stay the same as G changes.
The ideal dataset would allow us to observe the same consumers, with the same choice set of
vehicles, in the same xed market shares as gas prices change over time. Under these conditions, the
marginal consumer for each vehicle stays the same. The changes in gasoline prices would generate
variation in G - smaller or larger changes, depending on the fuel economy of each vehicle. In this
ideal world,  could then be consistently estimated using the following panel regression:
pjat =  

Gjat +  ja +  t + "jat (3)
9
In this equation,  ja is a constant for each "vehicle" of model j of age a, equal to a marginal
consumers willingness to pay to operate the vehicle. The variable  t captures changes in the overall
average price level at time t, and "jat is some econometric error. This approach is qualitatively
consistent with the analogous specications in Kahn (1986) and the literature that follows his
approach.9
Now let us relax the assumption the the vehicles quantity is constant. Either through new
vehicle sales or scrappage of used vehicles, we now recognize that the market share of the vehicle
in equation (1) is not fully inelastic. The quantity supplied qS is:
qS = 0 + 1p (4)
Equating quantity supplied with quantity demanded, the the equilibrium vehicle price is:
p =   
 + 1
G+
0   0
 + 1
(5)
Since upward sloping supply gives 1 > 0, a one dollar increase in gas costs results in a less
than one dollar decrease in vehicle price even when  = . Thus, estimating equation (3) when
supply is not fully inelastic would result in a downward bias in an estimate of  , which would lead
the analyst to incorrectly conclude that consumers undervalue gasoline costs. In other words, if
quantity q is correlated with G, then omitting q in the estimation of (3) will bias the estimated
coe¢ cient on G.
Production of new vehicles is much more price elastic than scrappage of used vehicles. Given
this, one response to the problem of elastic supply would be to analyze only the used vehicle
market, assuming that the e¤ect of gas price expectations on scrappage rates is negligible. However,
consumers also substitute between new and used vehicles with similar characteristics. If an increase
in gas prices leads to a decrease in production of new low fuel economy vehicles, this will increase
9After running the analogous specication, Kahn (1986) further experiments with di¤erent formulations of how
consumers update gasoline price expectations and eventually concludes that vehicle prices fully adjusted to gasoline
price changes in the 1970s.
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the willingness to pay for a substitutable used low fuel economy vehicle. Again referring to equation
(2), this substitution will generate a positive correlation between the G and the demand intercept .
Not accounting for this generates another correlation between G and the error term in estimating
equation (3), which would further bias downward an estimate of  and bias the analysis toward
concluding that consumers undervalue gasoline costs.
3 Model
In this section, we describe our discrete choice model, which addresses the concerns from the
previous section by endogenizing substitution patterns and changes in market shares. This model
will be a modication of the standard framework in the industrial organization discrete choice
literature, e.g. Berry (1994). In our static discrete choice model, consumers derive utility from
owning a vehicle and from consuming a numeraire good. In each period, indexed by t, consumers
have homogeneous expectations E[gt+1; gt+2; :::j
t] about the future path of gasoline prices g given
information set 
.
In each period, consumers choose from a set of new and used models j = 1; :::; Jt, where a
indexes the vehicles age. Consumers also can choose an outside option, denoted j = 0, which is
to own no vehicle and instead walk or take public transit. As in all static discrete choice models,
consumers choose a vehicle in each period and expect to hold the vehicle for the remainder of its
life.10 Consumer i receives indirect utility uijat from purchasing vehicle ja in year t:
uijat = (w   pjat)  Gjat +  jat + ijat (6)
In this equation, w is the consumers wealth, pjat is the purchase price, andGjat is the discounted
present value of future gasoline costs over the vehicles lifetime. If consumers value purchase price
and future gas costs equally, then  = . Gjat depends on the discount rate, expected future
gasoline prices, and expected usage of the vehicle; we will return to the construction of this variable
10 In reality, the consumers true problem is dynamic: at any point in time, she has the opportunity to re-sell the
vehicle and purchase a new one. In the results section and in Appendix A.1, we return to the assumptions required
to simplify the consumers demand problem from a dynamic choice to a static choice.
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in great detail in section 5. Note that we assume that consumers are risk neutral,11 and Gjat will
be constructed using expectations. The variable  jat is the present discounted value of the ow
utility that vehicle ja will provide to the average consumer over the rest of its lifetime from year t
forward.
As described in section 2, it is important to capture how a vehicles price might be a¤ected by
changes in the prices of substitutes: the model must capture, for example, how a decrease in the
price of new SUVs should a¤ect demand for used SUVs. This requires a reasonable model of how the
individuals unobserved "taste shock" ijat varies across vehicles. If taste shocks are uncorrelated
across vehicles, as in the homogeneous consumer logit model, substitution is proportional to market
shares. For example, as the price of a new SUV increases, the homogeneous consumer model predicts
that consumers would substitute equally to a used compact car and a used SUV that had the same
market share. In reality, we should expect more substitution to the used SUV, given that it is a
more similar product. Consumers that transport large families in an SUV will have a hard time
substituting to compact cars.
More realistic substitution patterns are captured econometrically by parameterizing correlations
in unobserved tastes ijat across vehicles. We use a nested logit framework, which allows consumers
idiosyncratic preferences to be correlated across vehicles within the same predetermined set of
vehicles, or "nest": corr(ijat; ij0a0t) is nonnegative when ja and j0a0 are in the same nest and zero
otherwise.12 We will estimate a parameter  related to these within-nest correlations.13
11Risk aversion does not bias our estimator if uncertainty over future gasoline prices is constant, or more weakly,
uncorrelated with the level of gas prices. Constant expected volatility in future gasoline prices would result in a risk
averse consumer having a lower willingness to pay for any particular vehicle. Because lower MPG magnies the e¤ect
of gasoline prices on a consumers gasoline expenditures, this e¤ect would be larger for low MPG vehicles. However,
any discount in the vehicles price due to constant gas price volatility predicted by a model of risk averse consumers
would be absorbed in the xed e¤ect.
In reality, however, implied volatility was positively correlated with gasoline prices over the study period. If
consumers are risk averse, this should cause consumers to want to substitute away from low MPG vehicles as volatilities
(and also prices) rose. Since we nd that relative prices of low fuel economy vehicles did not fall as much as predicted
when gasoline prices rise, the risk neutrality assumption actually strengthens our qualitative result.
12Another common way of parameterizing unobserved taste shocks is through a random coe¢ cients model, which
can allow preferences for continuous attributes such as horsepower and weight to vary across the population. We use
the nested logit because our choice set is unusually large and because it produces a transparent, simple log-linear
relationship between market-level prices and shares.
13 In particular, the cumulative distribution function for ijat for all ja for individual i at time t is: F () =
exp

 Pn2N Pja2Bn e ijat=(1 )1 . N is the set of all nests of vehicles, and Bn is the set of vehicles in nest k.
 is a parameter related to the within-nest correlation of utilities and will be estimated in the model. As  approaches
one, the within-nest correlation of utilities approaches one. If  = 0, the standard logit model is recovered. This
distribution can be extended to accommodate multiple nests or separate  parameters for each nest.
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As in other nested logit models, the nests are specied ex ante and determine the structure of
substitution patterns allowed by the model. Nests must be comprised of vehicles over which the
analyst believes are close substitutes. This division may occur along multiple dimensions, such as
vehicle class or age. We use class as the rst nest because this substitution is central to our analysis:
a consumer is unlikely to have equal preferences for vehicles of substantially di¤erent sizes, and
failing to account for this substitution pattern would likely lead us to overstate consumersability
to substitute among vehicles of di¤erent sizes and therefore di¤erent fuel economy ratings. This,
in turn, would lead us to overstate consumersresponsiveness to changes in gas price expectations.
It is well-known (e.g. Berry 1994) that if the utility of the outside good is normalized to zero,
the nested logit choice probabilities can be aggregated over the population to give a market-level
relationship between prices and shares:
ln sjat   ln s0t =  pjat   Gjat +  ln(sjat=snt) +  jat (7)
In this equation, sjat is the market share of vehicle ja, s0t is the share of the outside option,
and snt is the combined market share of all vehicles in nest n, of which vehicle ja is a member.
Recall that the purpose of the model is to test whether  = , i.e. whether consumers are indif-
ferent between one dollar in purchase price and one dollar in future gasoline costs. The market-level
relationship between equilibrium prices and quantities implied by this discrete choice framework
will be the basis of our empirical test. Finding from market data that  <  would suggest that
consumers underweight future gasoline costs relative to purchase price in their decision.14
4 Empirical Strategy
Any consistent estimator of equation (7) must address two problems. The rst is simultaneity
bias: prices and quantities are a¤ected by unobserved product attributes that enter utility func-
14We assume that  and  are constant and homogeneous in the population, which produces this simple hypothesis
that can be tested with a linear model. The marginal utility of money is likely to vary across consumers, which
explains di¤erences in preferences for luxury vehicles and vehicles of di¤erent ages. We proxy for this heterogeneity
using nests for vehicle age and luxury vehicles, as described in detail in section 7.
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tions through  . The second is the potential correlation of fuel economy and unobserved product
attributes in the cross section.
To address the rst problem, simultaneity bias, we will in the following subsection introduce
instrumental variables. These instruments will be more intuitive as instruments for market shares
instead of prices, so purely for intuition and notational convenience, we rearrange the market-level
relationship in equation (7) so that price is on the left hand side:
pjat =  1

(ln sjat   ln s0t)  

Gjat +


ln(sjat=snt) +
 jat

(8)
The second problem is that average utility obtained from a vehicle  jat depends on average
preferences for observed and unobserved characteristics. It is theoretically possible to estimate
equation (8) using a cross section of vehicles with di¤erent prices and fuel economy ratings. This
would require, however, that we observe and parameterize vehicle characteristics well enough to
assume that no unobserved part of  jat is correlated with fuel economy.
Instead, our panel identication strategy exploits model-by-age xed e¤ects  ja. Since observ-
able vehicle characteristics are e¤ectively identical across the years of vehicle ja, the deviation from
vehicle average utility is a year-specic unobservable:  jat =  ja + jat. After adding model year
xed e¤ects t a and a time dummy  t to absorb the outside option share ln s0t any overall shift
in the price level of vehicles, equation (8) becomes:
pjat =  

Gjat   1

ln sjat +


ln(sjat=snt) +
 ja

+  t + t a +
jat

(9)
Equation (9) resembles the reduced form equation (3) from section 2. Were we willing to assume
that market shares are xed, or more weakly, uncorrelated with G, then we could leave them in the
error term.  could then be identied as the coe¢ cient of Gjat in an estimation of equation (3).
Because of the evidence that both new vehicle sales and used vehicle scrappage respond to gasoline
prices, however, this estimator would be biased.
Our specication requires E[G] = 0, but allows E[ G] 6= 0. In words, the model-year specic
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unobservable characteristic must be uncorrelated with fuel economy and gas prices, but the xed
e¤ects allow vehicle characteristics that are xed within models across model years to be correlated
with fuel economy. Even after using xed e¤ects, however, the model year-specic unobservable
characteristic jat could still be correlated with market shares if, for example, a feature that is
specic to particular model year a¤ects both price and share: E[s] 6= 0. To address this, we
need an instrument that generates variation in market shares that is uncorrelated with unobserved
quality. As we will see momentarily, the fact that new vehicle sales respond to gasoline prices
suggests an instrument for used vehicle quantities. Interestingly, the problem that motivated this
approach - that market shares respond to gasoline prices - is also part of the solution.
4.1 Instruments and Two-Stage Least Squares
Our instrument exploits the stylized fact that vehicle market shares respond to gasoline prices. In
particular, in years when gasoline prices are high, more high fuel economy vehicles are sold. This
di¤erence in quantities in use then persists over time. For example, the increase in gasoline prices
from 2004 to 2005 means that there should be more two-year old gas guzzlers on the road in 2006
compared to 2007.
Our instrument for the market shares of used vehicles is the expected lifetime gasoline costs of
model j in year t a, when the vehicle was new, denoted Gj0(t a). This instrument acts conditional
on model year dummy variables, meaning that vehicles that have high values of Gj0(t a) relative to
other vehicles produced in the same year are expected to have lower sales. For vehicles of di¤erent
model years within the model-by-age xed e¤ect groups, this generates variation in market shares
that is independent of the demand shifter jat.
We assume that ln snt, the log market share of nest n, is independent of jat. Although it
is somewhat awkward, this is necessitated by the fact that, because the class-level nests include
vehicles of di¤erent model years, our instrument does not generate substantial variation in the nest
market shares. In practice, the nests include many vehicles, and the share of vehicle ja is a small
fraction of the share of nest n.15
15Any bias generated in b

depends on the covariance of Gjat and ln snt, and the covariance of ln snt and jat.
The expected supply response suggests that Gjat is likely to be negatively correlated to ln snt.  b will be biased
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The rst stage equation of the two stage least squares regression is:
ln sjat = 11Gj0(t a) + 12Gjat + 13 ln snt +  0ja + 
0
t + 
0
t a + 
0
jat (10)
In this equation, the primes on  0ja ,  0t, +0t a, and 
0
jat indicate that the concept of the variable
is the same as in the second stage, but the estimated value may of course be di¤erent in the rst
stage. The second stage is:
pjat =  

Gjat   1  

dln sjat   

ln snt +
 ja

+  t + t a +
jat

(11)
5 Data
We have assembled from multiple sources a comprehensive dataset of the average prices, quantities,
and characteristics of all passenger vehicle models registered in the US, in monthly cross sections
from January 1999 to December 2008. Our dataset comprises 1.1 million observations. Table 1
presents descriptive statistics. Appendix 2 provides extensive additional detail on data sources and
variable construction.
Used vehicle prices are based on auction data obtained from Manheim, the largest automobile
auctioneer in the United States. The principal buyers in the auctions are dealers who then resell the
used vehicles to customers. We have data on each of the approximately 4 million vehicle transactions
that occur annually through Manheim auctions, which accounts for half of the countrys auction
volume. We use the individual auction data to predict the mean price of each model in each month
t, adjusting for the vehicles condition, odometer reading, and region and method of sale. While
only about one in four used vehicles traded passes through an auction (Manheim 2009), the auction
market is the largest source of transaction price data. Furthermore, the Kelley Blue Book and other
upward (towards zero) if ln snt is positively correlated with jat. This occurs to the extent that unexplained shifts
in equilibrium prices and nest share are driven by shifts in the demand curve rather than shifts in the supply curve.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the automobile market is substantially driven by supply shifts, such as variation
in o¤-lease and rental vehicles entering the auction market. Therefore, while a bias is possible, we expect it to be
smaller in magnitude than in a model that does not account for vehicle substitutes.
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price guides, which are the starting point for price negotiations in many used vehicle transactions,
are largely based on auction prices.
New vehicle prices are from the Power Information Network, a network of dealerships managed
by JD Power and Associates. These dealerships report 2 million new vehicle transactions each year,
about 15% of the nations market. For each model, we observe monthly mean prices adjusted for
consumer cash rebates and the di¤erence between the negotiated trade-in price and the trade-in
vehicles actual resale value, if any. We also incorporate used vehicle retail transaction prices from
JD Power in specication checks.
We observe national-level quantities in use of each vehicle model in July of each year from 1999
through 2008. These data are from the National Vehicle Population Prole, which we obtained from
the automotive market research rm R.L. Polk. The quantities represent all vehicles registered as
of July 1, including both individual owners and eets such as taxis, rental cars, and corporate and
government motor pools. A vehicle may be driven on public roads only if it is registered, so this
database is exhaustive for all intents and purposes.
Fuel economy data were obtained from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which
has estimated the miles per gallon of all new vehicles since 1974. The EPA uses a test to determine
fuel economy over a standardized drive cycle and then adjusts the results to account for the typical
consumers in-use fuel economy. Vehicle classes, which are used to dene nests in the nested logit
model, are also taken from the EPAs fuel economy dataset. All other vehicle characteristics are
from the Wards Automotive Yearbook.
We dened a "vehicle" (in our notation, a ja combination) to capture all possible variation in
fuel economy ratings. This entailed disaggregation to the level of vehicle make, model name, trim
level, and the number of engine cylinders. The average make and model name combination in our
dataset includes four "models"; for example, there are eight di¤erent congurations of cars called
the model year 2004 Honda Civic (Dx, Vp (Coupe), Hybrid, etc.) that appear as separate "vehicles"
in our dataset. Data on new and used vehicle prices and registered quantities are matched using
digits from the Vehicle Identication Number that are common within a model and model year.
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5.1 Expected Discounted Gasoline Costs
We now describe the formulation of the di¤erent components of expected discounted gasoline costs
Gjat, including vehicle-miles traveled, survival probability, discount rates, and expected gasoline
costs. Given that our parameter of interest  will be the coe¢ cient on this variable, its construction
is especially important for producing convincing results. For example, using a lower discount
rate than consumers actually face would inate Gjat, thereby biasing b downward. Alternatively,
understating the expected lifetime or usage of the vehicle would deate Gjat, biasing b upward.
Although we use the best available data to construct the components of Gjat, any of these
calculations could be subject to debate. In determining each component, we therefore choose
"conservatively," meaning that if b is biased, it is biased upwards. By erring in this direction,
we will show that  < 1 for any plausible set of denitions of the components of Gjat. Readers
interested in even more detail on the construction of Gjat should consult the Data Appendix.
The variable Gjat is the net present value of expected lifetime gasoline costs over future years
s:
Gjat = Et
24t+(L 1 a)X
s=t+1
s t  gs mja  f 1jas  jas
35
=
t+(L 1 a)X
s=t+1
s t  Et[gs]  Et[mja]  Et
h
f 1jas
i
 Et

jas

(12)
L denotes the maximum possible lifetime of a vehicle, which we take to be 25 years. The variable
gs is a gasoline price in year s, mja is expected vehicle miles traveled (VMT), fjas is fuel economy in
miles per gallon, jas is the probability that the vehicle survives to year s conditional on surviving
to its current age, and  is an annual discount factor.16 We assume that Gjat is homogeneous for
all consumers that choose vehicle ja at time t.17
16We assume that vehicles survive with probability one throughout each year, then a fraction determined by jas
are removed from the market at the end of the year. We also model that all gasoline costs ow halfway through the
year.
17 In reality, there is substantial variation in vehicle-miles traveled across consumers that own the same vehicle.
Similarly, di¤erences across consumers in the proportion of city versus highway driving, other driving behavior, and
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The second line of equation (12) includes expectations of separate quantities - gasoline prices,
fuel economy, VMT, etc. - that we will derive from separate datasets. To get the product of these
separate expectations (in the second line) from the expectation of products (in the rst line) requires
that these variables are uncorrelated. A key concern about this assumption is that vehicle miles
traveledm are likely to respond to gasoline prices g. Indeed, there are a large number of papers that
estimate the short run elasticity of gasoline demand (e.g. Hughes, Knittel, and Sperling (2007),
Small and Van Dender (2007), and Davis and Kilian (2009)), which often nd that the parameter is
small but statistically non-zero. If owners of low fuel economy vehicles respond to high gas prices by
driving less, then we overstate their gas costs. However, the consumers utility from vehicle use also
decreases in response to the reduced driving. As discussed in Kahn (1986), the Envelope Theorem
implies that these changes are equal and opposite to rst order, and in our primary specications,
we assume away these e¤ects.
Our primary specication adopts this argument, using VMT predicted from year-2001 gasoline
prices and assuming that @m@g = 0. We also derive an alternative specication that captures the
e¤ects of intensive margin elasticity; see Appendix 2 for more detail. As we will later show, this
adjustment does not substantially a¤ect the results.
5.1.1 Vehicle-Miles Traveled and Survival Probability
To estimate Vehicle-Miles Traveled (VMT), we use publicly-available data in the 2001 National
Household Travel Survey. This is a nationally-representative survey of approximately 25,000 house-
holds that report, among many other variables, the age, fuel economy, and vehicle class for each
of their vehicles. As part of the survey, about 25,000 vehicles in the national sample had their
odometers read twice, with several months in between readings. These two readings were then
used to estimate annualized VMT. We regress annualized VMT on the vehicles age, class, and fuel
vehicle maintenance generate di¤erences in realized fuel economy. As gasoline price expectations change, the change
in relative prices between two vehicles is determined by some marginal consumer who is indi¤erent between them. In
practice, we use the mean VMT for that vehicle since we cannot identify the marginal consumer, but we do not have
a reason to believe that this choice generates a systematic bias in the computation of Gjat.
Note that changes in gasoline prices should lead to a re-sorting of vehicles across consumers with di¤erent VMT.
As gas prices increase, consumers with relatively high VMT are more likely to switch to a vehicle with higher MPG,
but consumers with relatively low VMT would switch to a vehicle with lower MPG. Intuitively, this re-sorting does
not a¤ect equilibrium relative prices as long as our the mean VMT for a vehicle is a good proxy for the VMT of a
consumer who remains on the margin for that vehicle as gas prices change.
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economy, and use these estimates to predict mja for all vehicles in our sample.
We compute survival probability based on observed survival probabilities in our registration
data. As with VMT, we assume that these survival probabilities do not depend on expected gasoline
prices. Note that since we regression-adjust vehicle VMT in the individual auction transactions to
a standardized value, the left-hand-side variable pjat is not a¤ected by changes in VMT, and thus
remaining lifetime, that may be driven by gas price di¤erences over the study period.
5.1.2 Discount Rates
The discount rate r =  1   1 that consumers apply to gasoline costs should reect the interest
rate on the marginal dollar spent on the vehicle. We present two potential benchmarks. First, for
a consumer who nances her vehicle, this should be the automobile loan interest rate. The JD
Power transaction data include the loan annual percentage rate for vehicles that were nanced at
the dealership. The transaction-weighted average real interest rate over the study period is 4.7
percent for new vehicles and 9.0 percent for used vehicles.
Second, for a consumer who purchases the vehicle with cash, the opportunity cost could be the
expected market returns on an alternative investment. The average real return on the S&P 500 from
1945-2008 was 5.78 percent, but given that the market and oil prices have a very small covariance,
the risk-adjusted discount rate for gasoline costs would in fact be close to the risk-free rate.18 Our
primary specication uses an annual real discount rate of 9 percent, which is conservatively at the
upper end of these benchmarks.
5.1.3 Gasoline Price Expectations
A perfect measure of consumersgasoline price expectations Et[gs] is not observed. Just as we could
frame the analysis as solving for an "implicit discount rate" at which b = 1, we could also solve for
18A risk averse consumer with declining marginal utility of consumption would want to risk-adjust returns for their
covariance with the market. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) allows us to compute the risk-adjusted rate
of return that the consumer would require for gasoline purchases, which can also be thought of as disinvestments in
gasoline. Annual data from 1945 to 2008 show that oil prices (and therefore gasoline prices) are slightly negatively
correlated with market returns, as measured by the S&P 500 stock index. Therefore, the CAPM predicts that a
consumer should expect a rate of return on a disinvestment in gasoline that is slightly higher than the risk-free rate
of return - by our calculations, about 1.6 percent. The CAPM therefore suggests that our higher discount rate is
quite conservative.
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any number of formulations of gasoline price expectations which produce that result. The objective
of our primary specication is to estimate  based on the most sensible set of expectations that
can be constructed. We will also present robustness checks using other sensible expectations, and
we will demonstrate that b = 1 only under implausible beliefs.
Gasoline prices move very closely with crude oil prices: Light Sweet Crude Oil spot prices
predict 93 percent of the monthly variance in gasoline prices. This implies that crude oil futures
prices are very good proxies for the markets expectation of future gasoline prices. A time series
of U.S. average retail gasoline price expectations Et[gs] is therefore constructed from Light Sweet
Crude Oil futures prices from two sources, the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) and the New York
Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). Table 2 shows the annual average real retail gasoline prices and
crude oil futures prices transformed to dollars per gallon of gasoline.
Although oil futures contracts are only traded with high liquidity for settlement dates less
than two to three years in the future, Table 2 illustrates that there are some trades observed for
settlement dates as far as ten years in the future. The market does not believe that gasoline prices
are a martingale: as illustrated in Figure 5, as gas prices rose between 2003 and 2008 above their
1990s average of approximately $1.50 per gallon, the futures market expected prices to eventually
return closer to that previous level. To model expectations for periods beyond the last settlement
date observed at each time t, our primary specication uses a simple model of mean-reverting
expectations, where deviations from a $1.50/gallon mean decay exponentially. As detailed in the
Data Appendix, the mean-reversion parameter is calibrated using all futures data since 1991. The
equation ts the data very well: it explains 85% of the variation in the observed futures prices over
our 1999-2008 study period.
5.2 Reduced Form Data Overview
The dataset we use is perhaps the most wide-ranging data ever assembled in the economics literature
on the automobile industry. Before moving to the parameter estimates, we nd it useful to give
an aggregate, reduced-form overview to build intuition for how the parameters are identied and
what the data will show.
Figure 2 illustrates the variation in the instrument Gj0(t a), which will identify price elasticity of
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demand. For di¤erent fuel economy categories, we plot the average value of the instrument for each
model year, conditional on time and model year dummies  and , which in the rst stage regression
will be the most important covariates, and on the  ja xed e¤ects. Although some identication
is generated by the e¤ects of the 1985-1986 gasoline price collapse, the primary source of variation
for the rst stage is from the gasoline price increase between 2003 and 2008. Over those years,
Gj0(t a)j( ; ) rises for the lowest MPG (highest GPM) classes, as illustrated by the solid black
and dashed blue lines. While unconditional Gj0(t a) also rises for higher MPG vehicles, it rises less
than for low MPG vehicles, so their conditional Gj0(t a)j( ; ) drops. Within the ja xed e¤ect
groups, this instrument will be negatively correlated with sales of new vehicles.
Figure 3 illustrates the variation in Gjat over the study period, conditional on the same dummy
variables and xed e¤ects. As gas prices rose in the latter half of the decade, the conditional
Gjatj( ; ) rose for low fuel economy vehicles, as again illustrated by the solid black and dashed
blue lines. Observe that the vertical ordering of the lines had been opposite before 2005: higher-
MPG vehicles have higher values of Gjatj( ; ). This is because the analysis looks within vehicle
over time, conditional on time dummies: for all vehicles, the within-vehicle values of Gjat between
2001 and 2005 are lower than after 2005, but they are relatively lower for gas guzzlers during the
early years of the study period. Another source of variation not shown by this graph comes from
the vehicles age: those with longer remaining lives see larger changes in Gjat when gas price
expectations change.
Figures 4 and 5 shift attention to the outcome variables of the rst and second stages. Figure
4 displays the sum of sales for vehicles below 19 MPG and above 28 MPG over the past ten years.
As gas prices rose between the 2004 and 2007 model years, higher MPG vehicles increased in sales
by 450,000 units per year, while sales of the lower-MPG vehicles decreased by 1.4 million units per
year. This reinforces the intuition for our instrument: there is a greater market share of three-year-
old high MPG vehicles now in 2010 than there were in 2007. This variation in available quantities
should cause variation in equilibrium prices.
Figure 5 shows the relative prices of two- to ve-year old vehicles in the same low and high
MPG categories. As spot gasoline prices rose over the study period, the relative prices of high MPG
vehicles similarly increased. Relative vehicle prices appear also to be responsive to higher-frequency
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gasoline price changes, mirroring changes from 2001-2003 and in 2005-2007.
Figure 5 reinforces the intuition for the "reduced form" version of our identication strategy.
Most of our identication comes from the gasoline price increase between 2002 and the end of our
study period in 2007-2008. Between the beginning and the end of that period, the incremental
cost to fuel the average high vs. low MPG vehicle illustrated in the gure increased by $3281,
from $4508 to $7790. Meanwhile, the relative price of the low MPG vehicle decreased by $2384,
from $6272 to $3889. In this reduced form example, with a particular subset of the market over a
particular time period, relative prices adjusted by 73 percent of the change in gasoline costs.
6 Results
This section presents the estimation results for the reduced form model in equation (3) and our
nested logit model in equation (9). We detail the sensitivity of our ndings to a large array of
modeling assumptions and explore various explanations for the results. The primary specication
uses the nested logit model with vehicle class as its only nest. To avoid having thinly-traded vehicles
drive the estimation results, we weight by the number of transactions within jat used to compute
pjat. The primary specication includes all passenger cars and light trucks age 0 to 25 years from
January 1999 through March 2008. It is important to end the primary specication in that month
because macroeconomic changes beginning in the second quarter of 2008 had substantial e¤ects on
vehicle markets which would be di¢ cult to model convincingly and could have di¤erent e¤ects on
di¤erent types of vehicles.
First Stage. Table 3 shows the rst stage regression results for the primary specication. The
rst stage can be viewed as a reduced form relation between new vehicle quantities and expected
gasoline costs. The log of market share (sjat) is regressed on expected gasoline costs (Gjat) and
the gas price instrument Gj0(t a), both measured in $1,000s. The negative coe¢ cient on the
instrument suggests that fewer new low fuel economy vehicles are sold in equilibrium when gas
price expectations are higher. This result is qualitatively consistent with analyses of new vehicle
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sales in recent analyses by Klier and Linn (2008), Li, Timmins, and von Haefen (2009), and Busse,
Knittel, and Zettelmeyer (2009).
Estimation Results. Table 4 compares di¤erent conceptual approaches to estimating  . Column
(1) is our primary specication: the instrumental variables estimation of the nested logit model.
The market share coe¢ cients indicate that a one percent increase in market share results in a $24
drop in the vehicles price, whereas a one percent increase in the market share of other vehicles
in the nest is associated with an $18 drop in price. Together, these suggest that the correlation
parameter  is just over 0.4, so that utilities within a class have a moderate correlation. The
coe¢ cient on gas cost is the negative of the estimate of  , meaning that
b
 = 0:61. Thus, our
primary specication suggests that changes in market equilibria account for 61 percent of gasoline
costs.
Column (2) shows the reduced form from equation (3), in which market shares are assumed
to be uncorrelated with Gjat. Our nding that b = 0:52 is consistent with the intuition that this
assumption biases the estimate towards zero due to endogenous market shares.
Column (3) illustrates a representative-consumer logit specication, instead of the nested logit.
The point estimate of  is larger than that of the reduced form, as expected. Because the
representative-consumer logit overstates substitutability between di¤erent vehicle classes, however,
it is unexpected that this specication gives a larger b than the nested logit model.
Column (4) in Table 4 shows the nested logit model, estimated using ordinary least squares
instead of the instrumental variables procedure. The discrete choice version of simultaneity bias
- the correlation between market shares and unobserved product quality - often causes estimated
price elasticities to have the wrong sign, and that is indeed what we observe here. This underscores
the importance of our instrument and IV procedure.
Alternative Nest Structures. Table 5 explores alternative nest structures, showing that the
basic result is not sensitive to alternate assumptions about substitution patterns. Column (2) allows
additional correlation in taste errors among vehicles in the same vehicle class and age category.19
19Stolyarovs (2002) analysis shows that vehicle trade volumes are highest for vehicle ages near ve and ten years.
We therefore dene the age categories to be 0-4 years, 5-10 years, and greater than 10 years.
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In this specication, a correlation is not allowed among vehicles of the same age category but of
di¤erent vehicle classes. Column (3) switches the order of these nests, in case this substitution
within age groups is relatively more important.
Column (4) of Table 5 uses a two level nested logit where the broader nest is vehicle class and
the narrower nest is the interaction of an indicator for whether the vehicle is of a luxury make and
an indicator for the continent where the rm is based (Europe, North America, or Asia). This
captures preferences of consumers to purchase a certain style of vehicle, such as a European
luxury mid-size sedan. Column (5) includes three nests: class, age category, and style. While the
coe¢ cients on share variables change as the nest structure is changed, b is quite stable. While
these alternative nest structures does not exhaust all possible forms of substitution patterns, they
do suggest that uncaptured substitution patterns in the primary specication are unlikely to cause
a bias in b . Appendix 3 presents a series of "reality checks" of the predicted substitution patterns,
including implied markups and own- and cross-price elasticities for popular vehicles.
Discount Rates. Related literature has framed the question as estimating the "implicit discount
rate" that sets  = 1. We chose our "attention weight" formulation because we suspect that it is
more behaviorally descriptive than an implicit discount rate, especially since the purchase prices of
autos and many other energy-using durables are often amortized over time when they are bought
on credit. It is useful, however, to compute this parameter for comparability with other studies
and to test how much alternative discount rates a¤ect b .
Columns (2)-(4) in Table 6 show estimates of  when consumers use a selected annual discount
rates rather than 9% in the primary specication. Consistent with intuition, consumers appear
more sensitive to gasoline costs when the higher discount rate attenuates the constructed Gjat
variable. The rates in columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 are chosen to show that b reaches unity only
when the discount rate reaches 27%, while b is statistically indistinguishable from one when the
annual discount rate is as low as 18%. Although some subprime borrowers face interest rates at
these levels,20 we believe that the upper bounds of the average interest rate benchmarks discussed
20For example, the mean annual nominal interest rate on very deep subprime loans described in Adams, et al.
(2009) is 26.2%.
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in Section 5.1.2 are appropriately conservative in the primary specication.
Static Model. In the literal interpretation of a static discrete choice model such as ours, con-
sumers choose a vehicle in each period, but they expect to hold the vehicle for the rest of its useful
life. In reality, the consumers true problem is dynamic: at every point in time, she will have the
opportunity to re-sell the vehicle and purchase a new one. A consumer who resells her vehicle has
smaller gasoline expenditures than Gjat, which is computed based on the expected fuel costs over
the life of the vehicle. However, the resale price that the consumer receives incorporates the fuel
costs over the remaining vehicle life after resale. Thus, regardless of whether the model is static
or dynamic, the purchase price should reect the full stream of future gasoline costs. We show
this more formally in Appendix A.1, which describes the assumptions required to simplify from a
dynamic model to the static model.
In Appendix A.1, the crucial assumption required to show that our static model is an unbiased
simplication of the dynamic problem is a weak form of stationarity: we must assume that when
forming beliefs about future resale prices, consumers believe that changes in gasoline prices are
uncorrelated with changes in future market shares. The stationarity assumption allows us to
substantially simplify how consumers form expectations of a vehicles future resale price. In practice,
market shares do respond to gas prices, and as discussed earlier in the paper, the e¤ect of this
response is to attenuate the e¤ect of gas price changes on relative vehicle price changes. If consumers
anticipate this future quantity response, a gas price increase should not decrease willingness to pay
for a gas guzzler as much as our model predicts. This simplication is not conservative: it biases
our estimator toward zero.
Perhaps the most aggressive test of the importance of this issue is to examine whether consumers
appear to fully value gas costs accrued only during the time that they will own the vehicle, regardless
of the resale value. Using information from Stolyarov (2002), we calculate that the median vehicle
holding period is ve years. As shown in column (5) of Table 5, b < 1 even when Gjat is computed
only over a ve-year time horizon.
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Intensive Margin. We account for the short-run elasticity of vehicle use to gasoline prices as
discussed during the formulation of Gjat and detailed in Appendix 2. Column (2) of Table 7 presents
the results of this alternative specication. The estimated b does not change signicantly, although
the standard error of the estimate increases.
Alternative Gasoline Price Expectations. While the primary specication arguably includes
the most defensible formulation of gasoline price expectations, we now present alternative formula-
tions. In column (3) of Table 7, consumers are assumed to believe that gas prices are a martingale,
so that any change in spot gas prices is assumed to be permanent. By overstating (relative to
the futures market) how gasoline price changes a¤ect changes in Gjat over time, the martingale
assumption would bias the model to expect larger changes in relative vehicle prices than the market
should actually generate. As illustrated by the regression results, this strengthens the rejection of
the null hypothesis.
One can also determine the degree of mean reversion that consumers expect in gasoline price
changes that is consistent with the rational model. Column (4) in Table 7 shows that this implicit
mean reversion constant is -0.29. This is substantially larger than the -0.057 suggested by the
futures market data. Loosely put, auto consumersbeliefs about future gasoline prices would need
to have been very strange to explain our results.21
Sticky Information. A burgeoning literature in macroeconomics, including Reis (2006) and
Mankiw and Reis, (2002, 2006), models consumers and rms that face costs in updating informa-
tion as they choose consumption plans and prices. As a result, consumption and prices do not
immediately and fully adjust to news, and they are sensitive to past news. Our model is identied
o¤ of variation in gasoline price expectations at a monthly frequency. Although most people pre-
sumably drive by a gas station with posted gasoline prices at some point during the choice process,
there is a frequency at which it would be unrealistic to expect vehicle market participants to update
21While many automobile consumers may not be aware of oil futures prices, information about the oil markets
expectations is likely to be transmitted to consumers through the news media, such as in Krueger (2005).
We believe that the assertion that the auto markets expectations of oil prices di¤ers substantially and predictably
from the oil markets expectations would be equally remarkable as our interpretation, which is that consumers form
expectations on average as if informed by futures markets but undervalue fuel costs in choosing between automobiles.
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information. In theory, both inattention to future fuel costs and inattention to "high-frequency"
uctuations in gasoline prices could explain our results.22
We test for sticky information by including changes in expected gasoline costs over recent pe-
riods: Gja(t s)   Gjat, with s =1, 4, and 12 months. In the null, where information is not sticky,
these changes should not be correlated with current prices. As shown in Table 8, these changes are
signicantly correlated with pjat, which provides empirical support for sticky information. Control-
ling for these recent changes, however, does not statistically change b , and the estimate remains
signicantly less than unity.
Sensitivity to Time Period and "Extraordinary" Events. In principle, it is possible that

 has changed over time. In practice, our estimation strategy is limited by the fact that su¢ cient
variation in gas prices is needed both during the period when the observed vehicles were produced
(for power in the rst stage) and during the period of study (for power in the second stage). In
Table 9, we break the sample into earlier and later periods, 1999-2005 and 2004-2008.23 In column
(2), b is larger for the early period than the full sample, but also has a larger standard error, most
likely due to lower variation in gas prices during that period. In fact, the estimate is statistically
indistinguishable from unity and from the primary specication. In column (3), b is nearly identical
for the later time period as for the full sample.
Ending our primary specication after March 2008 comes at the cost of eliminating potentially-
useful variation in gasoline price expectations: retail spot prices rose from $3.07 in March to
$3.61 in July, and the 8-9 year futures rose by almost as much. Furthermore, one might believe
22To formalize this, notice that the utility function could have been written with separate parameters e and  for
attention to the vehicles average future gas costs over time Gja and deviations from that average Gjat  Gja:
uijat = (w   pjat)  (Gjat  Gja)  eGja +  jat + ijat (13)
Given the use of xed e¤ects, e is not identied. The ideal test between these two explanations would be to have
one permanent change to the markets gasoline price expectations with no corresponding changes to the choice set.
Estimating the rate of relative vehicle price adjustment over the ensuing time period would give a sense of information
di¤usion, while estimating 

with vehicle prices after a very long time would be a convincing measure of attention
to future gas costs with full information.
23The ends of the periods are chosen in order to avoid weak instruments. They are determined such that the F-
statistic of the correlation of the excluded instrument with the endogenous variable is greater than 16.38, the critical
value such that the maximal size of a Wald test with  = 0:05 is less than 0.1, as suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005).
This rule led to a two year overlap in the time periods.
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that consumers became especially attentive to gasoline prices as they spiked during that year. This
would be consistent with existing work that models "extraordinary" events about which information
di¤uses instantly (Reis 2006) or that cause consumers to update beliefs between coarse categories
(Mullainathan 2002) - e.g. from gas costs being "inconsequential" to gas costs being "high." Column
(4) of Table 9 repeats the primary specication including April through December 2008. The point
estimate of b is closer to unity, but still signicantly di¤erent from that value and not statistically
di¤erent from the primary specication.24
Changing Consumer Preferences and Vehicle Characteristics. Changes over time in un-
observed consumer preferences, as modeled by jat, could bias our estimate of

 if they are correlated
with Gjat. A leading suggestion is that consumers became increasingly "green," or environmentally-
oriented, over the study period, resulting in increased preference for high fuel economy vehicles
independent of the nancial savings. This example causes a bias away from concluding that con-
sumers undervalue gasoline costs: it is an unaccounted e¤ect that should increase the relative price
of high fuel economy vehicles over time, while we nd that the relative price of high fuel economy
vehicles did not increase as much as the model predicts. Columns (2) and (3) in Table 10 show that
excluding hybrids or vehicles rated as the most green25 indeed cause the estimated b to move
slightly further away from unity.
Similarly, our estimator could be biased if changes in unobserved vehicle characteristics within
a model j over model years are correlated with Gjat. For example, we have limited statistical evi-
dence (available upon request) that manufacturers changed amenities, such as engine displacement,
torque, wheelbase, and stability control, di¤erentially within low-vs. high MPG models over time.
We address this partially by dening vehicles as di¤erent models j if their engine displacement or
fuel economy change by more than ten percent between model years. Perhaps the best suggestive
test of the importance of these concerns is to add controls for all observed characteristics, which
still have some small residual variance conditional on the xed e¤ects. Columns (4) and (5) of
24 In a similar vein, we nd in an alternate specication (not shown) that each $1 increase in gas costs has a
statistically signicant 1.5 cent greater e¤ect on prices in months when retail gas prices changed by at least ten cents
per gallon. This provides some evidence that consumers may be more attentive during periods of larger change, but
the di¤erence is economically small and does not appear to explain our primary ndings.
25Dened as the top 60 vehicles in Yahoos ranking of the 100 greenest vehicles, at
http://autos.yahoo.com/green_center-top100/
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Table 10 show that these controls have almost no impact on the results, suggesting that most likely
any correlation between gas costs and unobserved changes in characteristics is small.
A related concern is that unobserved vehicle characteristics are correlated with the instrument
Gj0(t a). While again, we cannot directly test the exclusion restriction, we can test whether within-
model observable characteristics a¤ect the rst stage relationship. The respective rst stages (not
shown) of the specications in columns (4) and (5) of Table 10 similarly indicate that the additional
controls have almost no impact on the rst stage coe¢ cients.
Used Vehicle Retail Prices from JD Power Dealership Data. Because we use xed e¤ects,
as long as changes in Gjat are passed through from wholesale to resale prices in levels, the use of
wholesale vs. retail data should not a¤ect our estimated b . As an additional specication check,
however, we estimate the model using retail transaction prices for used vehicles, which are also
included in the JD Power dealership data. Many of these are the same vehicles that went through
the Manheim auctions. We use the Manheim wholesale data as the measure of used vehicle prices
in our primary specication because these data include substantially more jat observations (over
one million vs 500,000), while there are fewer than 1000 observations in JD Power that are not in
Manheim.
As shown in Table 11, retail prices predict a smaller b than do auction prices. Column (2)
repeats the primary specication, except limited to the sample of vehicles that are common to both
data sets. Column (3) shows the same sample with the JD Power used vehicle prices. Column
(4) shows the full JD Power sample. These suggest that retail-wholesale markups for used vehicles
are actually slightly negatively correlated with gas costs Gjat within vehicle, and thus our primary
specication may slightly overstate consumersb .
Measurement Error. If the gas cost variable Gjat is measured with error, the estimate of b may
be a¤ected by attenuation bias.26 The three components of this constructed variable that are most
26Measurement error is a separate issue from heterogeneity in gas costs across consumers. While this heterogeneity
certainly exists, our results are consistent if we observe without error the gas costs of a marginal individual who
determines the relative price of a vehicle. Furthermore, as discussed in section 4.2, we intentionally introduced
conservative biases in Gjat. Because these are consistent biases in variable construction, they are distinct from the
type of measurement error considered in this subsection.
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likely to be measured with error are gasoline prices, miles per gallon, and vehicle miles traveled. We
examine each of these separately by instrumenting for gasoline costs Gjat with a quantity which
is correlated with gas costs, but (we hope) not the econometric error. Each instrument will be
constructed similarly to Gjat with equation (12), but with one di¤erence.
To address potential measurement error in gasoline prices, our instrument is Gjat calculated
with lagged gasoline prices and price expectations. Columns (2) and (3) of Table 12 show the
results when the instrument is calculated with a one month and one year lag, respectively. To
address measurement error in fuel economy, our instrument is Gjat computed with the average
inverse fuel economy (gallons per mile) across a model and age. Column (4) shows the result
with this instrument. To address measurement error in vehicle miles traveled, our instrument is
Gjat computed with an annual VMT of 12,000 miles for all vehicles. Column (5) shows the result
with this instrument. b is not signicantly di¤erent from the primary specication in any of these
columns.
6.1 Magnitude of Mispricing
What are the real-world magnitudes of our parameter estimates? For a set of example vehicles, we
now illustrate how much the null hypothesis predicts that vehicle prices should change, compared
to how much they do change.
Recognize rst that our empirical approach is not informative about the absolute mispricing
of each vehicle at a given time. Our coe¢ cient estimates do predict, however, how much the
relative prices of vehicles with di¤erent fuel economy ratings change in response to a given change
in gasoline price expectations. Consider a set of example used vehicles that will hypothetically be
driven 12,000 miles per year for the remaining seven years of their lifetimes. The "Predicted Price
Change" line in Figure 7 illustrates changes in relative prices caused by a permanent $1 increase
in gasoline prices. This line is computed using the change in Gjat for these example used vehicles
and the b from our primary specication. The Honda Civic, which has fuel economy of 30 miles
per gallon, is normalized to have zero relative price change. We hold market shares constant, so
this can be viewed as a short-run e¤ect on prices.
As shown in the graph, our parameter estimates predict that a Ford F-150, rated at 15 MPG,
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with this assumed VMT and remaining lifetime would see its relative price drop by $1010 compared
to the Honda Civic. The double line on the graph presents the relative price changes that would be
expected if  = 1; the F-150s relative price should drop by $1660. This $650 di¤erence suggests
that vehicles were substantially mispriced as gasoline prices changed over the study period.
7 Welfare Implications
A leading explanation for our empirical result is that consumers misoptimize: they are less attentive
to gasoline costs than to purchase prices. For this section, we take as given that this argument
is accepted. What, then, are the welfare gains from policies to correct this misoptimization?
This section denes the hedonic utility function, develops a new and highly tractable approach to
behavioral welfare analysis in a discrete choice setting, and presents the welfare results.
We distinguish between choice utility, the utility function that the consumer maximized at the
time of choice, and hedonic utility, the utility that the consumer actually experienced as a result of
the choice. The original utility function in equation (6) was the choice utility function, as it was
used to parameterize a demand model estimated o¤ of consumersobserved choices. For rational
consumers, choices maximize hedonic utility, and choice utility and hedonic utility are equivalent.
If we accept that choices do not reveal hedonic utility, however, we must take an alternative stand
on how to construct hedonic utility functions. Our approach is to maintain the assumption that a
fully-optimizing agent would have  = b: consumersresponses to purchase price variation reect
their true marginal utility of money.2728 The hedonic utility function is:
27We note that our results are also theoretically consistent with consumers that attend correctly to gasoline costs but
are over -attentive to purchase price relative to their private optimum. Interestingly, if this were the case, correcting
the internality would cause consumers to be less price elastic and thus to buy more expensive cars, which on average
have lower fuel economy. However, the idea that consumers correctly perceive product price but can misperceive other
costs due to sales tax, future gasoline prices, add-ons, and shipping and handling appears to be the most natural
interpretation of the results of our paper and related work.
28Our approach can be thought of as an application of Bernheim and Rangel (2009) to the case of misoptimization
in discrete choice models. In their language, vehicle purchase is a "Generalized Choice Situation" in which consumer
i chooses between a set of vehicles with total discounted user costs pjat+Gjat and utility ows  jat+ ijat. Whether
the total cost ows through p or G is an "ancillary condition," meaning that while it may a¤ect choices by agents who
misoptimize, it is not material to welfare. We estimate elasticity to total discounted user cost from only the "welfare-
relevant domain," which we assume to be only the variation generated by variation in purchase prices. Conversely,
we assume that variation in total discounted user cost resulting from variation in G is "suspect," meaning that it
should not be used to infer utility functions.
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uijat = (w   pjat  Gjat) +  jat + ijat (14)
We note that, as in the empirical analysis, the problem has been simplied by assuming zero
wealth e¤ects. Consumer is hedonic utility uhijat from choice jat can be written as choice utility
ucijat minus an "internality" u
b
ijat:
uhijat = u
c
ijat   ubijat (15)
In our application, ub captures the utility value of the portion of future gasoline costs that the
consumer did not appropriately value in the discrete choice. This can be thought of as consumption
of the numeraire good that the consumer anticipated having at the time of the discrete choice, but
does not actually have because of additional expenditures on gasoline. Subtracting uh from uc, we
have:
ubijat = (   )Gjat (16)
The analytical appeal of this approach is that we have written hedonic utility as the sum of
two terms that can be integrated over consumers. Summing over the choices made by consumers of
market sizeM and transforming from utility to dollar terms by dividing by , we have the expected
internality CSb:
CSb =
1

 1
M
MX
i=1
ubi = (1 


)Gjat  sjat (17)
Dene the variable jat =  pjat   Gjat +  jat as the average choice utility for product ja at
time t. We integrate up over the logit error to get the expectation of "choice consumer surplus"
using well known formulas originally from Small and Rosen (1981), modied for the nested logit.
Omitting the constant for exposition, we have:
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CSc =
1

ln
24X
n2N
24 X
ja2Bn
exp

jat
1  
351 35 (18)
Having dened the analytical approach to welfare analysis of policy changes, consider now a
"Behavioral Feebate" policy designed to move consumers purchasing new vehicles to their private
optima. The Behavioral Feebate imposes a fee on new vehicle purchases of the fraction of lifetime
gas costs that consumers appear to undervalue, (1  b ) Gjat, while rebating some amount R. The
amount of the Feebate Fjat is:
Fjat =
8><>:

1  

Gjat  R; a = 0
0; a > 0
9>=>; (19)
Observe that when this Fjat is substituted into new vehicle price in the equation for average
choice utility jat, it produces a coe¢ cient of  on Gjat:
jat =  

pjat +

1  


Gjat  R

  Gjat +  jat (20)
= (w   pjat  Gjat +R) +  jat (21)
The choice utility function now equals the hedonic utility function, with the addition of R,
which modies the price level. In our Behavioral Feebate counterfactual, we choose to use the R
such that the policy leaves unchanged the aggregate market share of new vehicles. Put di¤erently,
this assumes that consumers will not perceive a change in new vehicle price level from the policy,
only a change in relative prices across vehicles. Because this policy need not be revenue-neutral,
to compute the change in choice consumer surplus, any decit or surplus funds are recycled to all
consumers (including those who purchase the outside option) as a lump sum tax or subsidy.
We recognize that under the counterfactual policy, many aspects of vehicle markets would be
di¤erent. For example, relative prices of used high fuel economy vehicles would increase, and
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auto manufacturing rms would likely o¤er more high MPG vehicles and invest more in R&D
to improve fuel economy. Simulating these e¤ects is well beyond the scope of this paper. Our
simulation assumes that the prices and characteristics of the year 2007 choice set are constant,
adds Fjat to vehicle prices, and resimulates market shares.
The tted average utility from vehicle ownership b jat is backed out from the observed baseline
market shares sjat and the estimated demand parameters b, b, and b, using equation (7). As in the
estimation, the outside option is its own nest, with utility normalized to zero. Intuitively, welfare
gains ow through the fact that the feebate causes consumers to spend less money on gasoline and
more on some combination of higher fuel economy vehicles and the numeraire good.
7.1 Welfare Analysis Results
Table 13 shows the simulation results. All new vehicles with fuel economy below the "pivot" of
19.0 MPG see an increase in sales, while those with fuel economy below 19.0 MPG see a decrease.
The average fuel economy of the new vehicle eet increases by 2.36 miles per gallon.
Choice consumer surplus CSh drops by a net present value of $17 per potential vehicle consumer
per year of the Behavioral Feebate policy, as the policy moves consumers away from their perceived
optimum. The average internality CSb, however, is $32 lower. Hedonic consumer surplus therefore
increases by $15, as consumers buy higher fuel economy vehicles, total gasoline costs drop, and
consumers spend more on the numeraire good.
The policy reduces gasoline use by each years new vehicle consumers by 37.5 gallons over the
lives of their vehicles. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the marginal damages of carbon
dioxide emissions are $30 per metric ton, this translates into a reduction in climate damages of
$7.60 in present discounted value.
Comparing these gures shows that the welfare gains from reducing negative externalities are
smaller than the welfare gains from reducing the "internality" by inducing consumers to make the
privately-optimal choice. Intuitively, if we believe that the externality is much less per gallon than
the current price, misoptimization over future fuel costs reduces the consumers own private utility
more than it hurts external social welfare. An important takeaway from this analysis, then, is
that behavioral misoptimization can be a more powerful justication for energy e¢ ciency and fuel
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economy standards than internalizing environmental externalities. In a theoretical sense, of course,
this was clear a priori : if consumers did not misvalue future gasoline costs, there is no economic
argument for adding a fuel economy standard or feebate to the optimal Pigouvian energy tax.
While environmental externalities have often been the center of the discussion of energy e¢ ciency
standards, feebates, and fuel economy standards, this simple analysis suggests that understanding
consumer choice is much more important from a welfare perspective.
8 Conclusion
For more than 30 years, economists have attempted to estimate "implicit discount rates": how
much weight consumers place on future energy costs (or other future costs) when they buy energy-
consuming durable goods. Building on this literature, this paper tests whether vehicle prices and
market shares respond to changes in gasoline price expectations in a way that is consistent with
consumers who value equally $1 in purchase price and $1 in present discounted fuel costs. We
use a discrete choice demand model that addresses several economic and econometric challenges,
and we introduce a new instrument for vehicle prices into the empirical literature on automobile
demand. The results show that vehicle market equilibria underadjust to changes in expected future
gas costs: prices and market shares move as if consumers are willing to pay only $0.61 up front to
reduce discounted gasoline costs by $1.
The estimated responsiveness of vehicle prices and shares to expected gas costs depends on
assumptions about expectations of future gas prices, vehicle lifetime, consumersdiscount rates,
substitution patterns, and other parameters. We show, however, that market equilibria move as
predicted by the null hypothesis only under implausible sets of assumptions. We explore a variety of
explanations for our results, including risk aversion, measurement error, sticky information, credit
constraints, changes in consumer preferences over time, and other factors. A plausible explanation
for the empirical results appears to be that gasoline costs are a "shrouded attribute," and consumers
attend to them less than upfront prices at the time of purchase.
This explanation implies that two types of policies could theoretically increase welfare. The
rst are information provision or marketing programs that nudge consumers toward attending to
36
fuel economy at the time of choice. While these policies are relatively palatable to economists, it is
not obvious that their e¤ects are large. For example, auto dealerships are already required to post
fuel economy labels on the windows of all new vehicles on their sales lots.
A second type of policies move from "soft paternalism" to paternalism. Feebates, gas guzzler
taxes, and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards tax or limit the sale of high fuel economy
vehicles. In a simple welfare calculation such as ours, these substantially increase welfare, by
increasing purchases of high fuel economy vehicles with future nancial benets that consumers
undervalued relative to their private optimum.
While our results may provide some economic justication for these policies, this should be
viewed very tentatively. As an example of why, notice that our empirical analysis and welfare
calculation assumed for simplicity that the misvaluation of future fuel costs is homogenous in the
population. In reality, this parameter presumably varies across individuals and over time: some
consumers may overvalue fuel economy in their decisions, while others undervalue it, and this may
change depending on media coverage of gas prices, automakerssales practices and advertising, or
other factors. "Behavioral Feebates" and fuel economy standards are blunt instruments in that they
can only generate optimal vehicle choices for one level of misvaluation. As a result, any given policy
of this type will be too large for some consumers and too small for others relative to the optimum.
Our future work, using randomized trials and natural experiments as well as applied theory, aims
to conrm these empirical results, shed additional light on potential explanations, and formalize
the implications for business strategy and policy.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Full sample 2007 new models
Year 2003.7 2007.0
( 2.8 ) ( 0.0 )
Model Year 1996.4 2007.0
( 5.6 ) ( 0.0 )
Age (years) 7.3 0.0
( 5.2 ) ( 0.0 )
Price 7,863 24,872
( 8,863 ) ( 10,383 )
Miles per gallon 19.1 20.8
( 4.2 ) ( 5.1 )
Expected lifetime gas costs 6,727 12,283
(2005 $) ( 3,794 ) ( 3,473 )
Horsepower 236.4 260.9
( 104.7 ) ( 77.8 )
Weight (pounds) 4,296 4,617
( 1,441 ) ( 1,035 )
Wheelbase (inches) 121.8 125.8
( 19.7 ) ( 19.8 )
Fraction cars 0.61 0.53
Observations 1,143,610 9,127
Notes: Means are quantity-weighted. Standard deviations in parenthesis. The full sample includes monthly obser-
vations Jan 1999 - Dec 2008 of all passenger cars and light trucks age 0-25. Column (2) includes 2007 model year
vehicles observed in 2007. See text for calculation of expected gas costs.
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Table 2: Gasoline Prices and Expectations
Year Spot Future Year
0-1 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10
1998 1.34 1.44 1.46 1.47 1.47 1.46 1.46 1.46 1.45 - -
1999 1.43 1.50 1.46 1.45 1.44 1.44 1.43 1.43 1.39 - -
2000 1.77 1.73 1.61 1.56 1.51 1.49 1.47 1.46 - - -
2001 1.69 1.65 1.59 1.55 1.52 1.51 1.49 1.48 1.47 - -
2002 1.56 1.63 1.58 1.55 1.53 1.51 1.50 1.48 1.50 - -
2003 1.74 1.71 1.62 1.59 1.58 1.57 1.56 1.55 1.59 - -
2004 1.99 1.95 1.84 1.78 1.74 1.70 1.68 1.66 1.75 - -
2005 2.34 2.33 2.28 2.22 2.15 2.10 2.06 2.03 2.02 - -
2006 2.55 2.55 2.55 2.49 2.42 2.36 2.32 2.27 - - -
2007 2.68 2.59 2.55 2.50 2.46 2.42 2.39 2.40 2.37 2.35 2.56
2008 3.00 3.12 3.10 3.08 3.06 3.04 3.02 2.99 2.97 2.95 2.67
Note: All prices are in dollars per gallon and are ination adjusted to 2005 dollars. Futures prices are transformed
via regression from oil prices to gasoline prices and deated to 2005 dollars using ination expectations implied by
Treasury Ination-Protected Security prices.
Table 3: Nested Logit First Stage
(1)
Instrumented variable: ln sjat
Gjat -0.02
( 0.02 )
G at age 0 -0.13
( 0.02 )
Observations 1,053,058
ja groups 37,794
R-squared 0.06
F (excl instruments) 29.1
Notes: Sample includes monthly observations Jan 1999 - Mar 2008 of all passenger cars and light trucks age 0-25.
Model*age xed e¤ects, monthly time dummies, and model year dummies are included. The instrument G at age 0
is the expected gas cost in the year the vehicle was new. All regressors are measured in $1,000s. Standard errors are
robust and clustered by ja (model * age).
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Table 4: Comparison of Reduced Form and Nested Logit
Dependent variable: Vehicle price
Specication (1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary Reduced form Logit Nested Logit OLS
Gjat -0.61 -0.52 -0.78 -0.38
[ =] ( 0.07 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.04 )
ln(market share) -2372 -2950 179
[ (1  )=] ( 723 ) ( 734 ) ( 38 )
ln(nest share) -1807 -1981
[-=] ( 655 ) ( 358 )
Observations 1,053,058 1,053,058 1,053,058 1,053,058
ja groups 37,794 37,794 37,794 37,794
F (excl inst) 29.1 33.8
Notes: Sample includes monthly observations Jan 1999 - Mar 2008 of all passenger cars and light trucks age 0-25.
Model*age xed e¤ects, monthly time dummies, and model year dummies are included. Market share variables are
instrumented in columns (2) and (4). Columns (3) and (4) use a nested logit model with vehicle class as the only
nest. Nest share is the share of all vehicles in the same class. Standard errors are robust and clustered by ja (model
* age).
Table 5: Alternative Nest Structures
Dependent variable: Vehicle price
Specication (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Primary Class/Age Age/Class Class/Style 3 nests
Gjat -0.61 -0.60 -0.72 -0.60 -0.59
[ =] ( 0.07 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.07 )
ln(share) -2372 -2455 -2766 -2398 -2581
[ (1  1)=] ( 723 ) ( 735 ) ( 824 ) ( 743 ) ( 789 )
ln(nest 1 share) -1807 -4598 -2349 -2412 -4365
[ (1   2)=] ( 655 ) ( 1295 ) ( 1612 ) ( 831 ) ( 1324 )
ln(nest 2 share) 2304 -731 650 1089
[ (2   3)=] ( 805 ) ( 514 ) ( 651 ) ( 878 )
ln(nest 3 share) 1071
[ 3=] ( 479 )
Observations 1,053,058 1,053,058 1,053,058 1,053,058 1,053,058
ja groups 37,794 37,794 37,794 37,794 37,794
F (excl inst) 29.1 28.7 27.1 28.1 25.9
Notes: Sample includes monthly observations Jan 1999 - Mar 2008 of all passenger cars and light trucks age 0-25.
Model*age xed e¤ects, monthly time dummies, and model year dummies are included. Column (1) is the primary
specication from Table 3, column (1). Nest 1 shareis the share of all vehicles in the same class. For models with
two nests, nest 1 sharedenotes the share of all vehicles in the narrowest nest (e.g. the number of vehicles in the
same class and age category for column (2)), and nest 2 sharedenotes the share of all vehicles within the broadest
nest. Nest shares are similarly dened for the model with three nests. Column (2) uses two nests, vehicle class, and
age buckets (0-4 years, 5-10 years, 11+ years). Column (3) reverses the order of the nests. Column (4) uses as a
second nest the styleof a vehicle (indicators for whether vehicle is a luxury make and whether the rm is based in
Europe, North America, or Asia). Column (5) includes all three nests. Standard errors are robust and clustered by
ja (model * age).
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Table 6: Alternative Discount Rates and Time Horizon
Dependent variable: Vehicle price
Specication (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Primary r = 5% r = 18% r = 27% 5 yr horizon
Gjat -0.61 -0.52 -0.81 -1.02 -0.79
[ =] ( 0.07 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.11 ) ( 0.09 )
ln(market share) -2372 -2442 -2248 -2168 -2029
[ (1  )=] ( 723 ) ( 720 ) ( 726 ) ( 728 ) ( 726 )
ln(nest share) -1807 -1804 -1816 -1825 -1842
[-=] ( 655 ) ( 663 ) ( 640 ) ( 630 ) ( 612 )
Observations 1,053,058 1,053,058 1,053,058 1,053,058 1,053,058
ja groups 37,794 37,794 37,794 37,794 37,794
F (excl inst) 29.1 30.1 27.6 26.7 25.4
Notes: Sample includes monthly observations Jan 1999 - Mar 2008 of all passenger cars and light trucks age 0-25.
Model*age xed e¤ects, monthly time dummies, and model year dummies are included. Column (1) is the primary
specication from Table 3, column (1). Nest share is the share of all vehicles in the same class. A 9% annual discount
rate is assumed in the calcuation of gas costs. Columns (2)-(4) use a 5%, 18%, and 27% discount rate in the calcuation
of gas costs, respectively. Column (5) uses a 9% discount rate but only accounts for the next 5 years of gas costs.
Standard errors are robust and clustered by ja (model * age).
Table 7: Alternate Gas Price Expectations and Vehicle Usage
Dependent variable: Vehicle price
Specication (1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary Intensive mrgn Martingale Mean reversion
Gjat -0.61 -0.35 -0.44 -1.00
[ =] ( 0.07 ) ( 0.14 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.15 )
ln(market share) -2372 -1749 -1538 -4034
[ (1  )=] ( 723 ) ( 785 ) ( 643 ) ( 1037 )
ln(nest share) -1807 -1742 -1908 -2149
[-=] ( 655 ) ( 579 ) ( 544 ) ( 887 )
Observations 1,053,058 1,053,058 1,053,058 1,053,058
ja groups 37,794 37,794 37,794 37,794
F (excl inst) 29.1 18.5 29.1 26.7
Notes: Sample includes monthly observations Jan 1999 - Mar 2008 of all passenger cars and light trucks age 0-25.
Model*age xed e¤ects, monthly time dummies, and model year dummies are included. Column (1) is the primary
specication from Table 3, column (1). Nest share is the share of all vehicles in the same class. Column (2) assumes
that vehicle usage changes with gas prices; see Appendix 2 for a complete description. Column (3) assumes martingale
expectations of gas prices. Column (4) assumes mean reverting gas prices with constant -0.29; see Appendix 2 for a
complete description. Standard errors are robust and clustered by ja (model * age).
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Table 8: Sticky Prices
Dependent variable: Vehicle price
Specication (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Primary
Gjat -0.61 -0.66 -0.68 -0.64 -0.63
[ =] ( 0.07 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.09 )
1 month lag -1.13 -1.07
( 0.08 ) ( 0.08 )
4 month lag -0.40 -0.28
( 0.08 ) ( 0.07 )
12 month lag -0.08 0.18
( 0.08 ) ( 0.09 )
Observations 1,053,058 1,053,058 1,053,058 1,053,058 1,053,058
ja groups 37,794 37,794 37,794 37,794 37,794
F (excl inst) 29.1 28.6 26.9 24.1 23.9
Notes: Sample includes monthly observations Jan 1999 - Mar 2008 of all passenger cars and light trucks age 0-25.
Model*age xed e¤ects, monthly time dummies, and model year dummies are included. Column (1) is the primary
specication from Table 3, column (1). Nest share variables are not shown in this table. Columns (2)-(5) add controls
for Gja(t s)  Gjat, where s is 1, 4, or 12 months. Standard errors are robust and clustered by ja (model * age).
Table 9: Alternate Time Periods
Dependent variable: Vehicle price
Specication (1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary Jan 99 - Dec 05 Jan 04 - Mar 08 Jan 99 - Dec 08
Gjat -0.61 -0.90 -0.59 -0.69
[ =] ( 0.07 ) ( 0.14 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.06 )
ln(market share) -2372 -4301 -3447 -2415
[ (1  )=] ( 723 ) ( 1296 ) ( 850 ) ( 690 )
ln(nest share) -1807 -602 -2012 -1944
[-=] ( 655 ) ( 957 ) ( 859 ) ( 655 )
Observations 1,053,058 766,713 524,093 1,143,593
ja groups 37,794 27,825 25,976 38,534
F (excl inst) 29.1 17.6 24.4 31.5
Notes: Sample includes monthly observations Jan 1999 - Mar 2008 of all passenger cars and light trucks age 0-25.
Model*age xed e¤ects, monthly time dummies, and model year dummies are included. Column (1) is the primary
specication from Table 3, column (1). Nest share is the share of all vehicles in the same class. Columns (2)-(4) limit
the sample to the time periods shown. Standard errors are robust and clustered by ja (model * age).
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Table 10: Changing Characteristics and Preferences
Dependent variable: Vehicle price
Specication (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Primary Exclude hybrids Exclude green Char. sample Char. control
Gjat -0.61 -0.61 -0.49 -0.57 -0.57
[ =] ( 0.07 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.09 )
ln(market share) -2372 -2385 -2617 -1695 -1706
[ (1  )=] ( 723 ) ( 727 ) ( 716 ) ( 1019 ) ( 1017 )
ln(nest share) -1807 -1807 -1652 -132 -298
[-=] ( 655 ) ( 657 ) ( 701 ) ( 1099 ) ( 1119 )
Observations 1,053,058 1,052,577 1,013,868 171,873 171,873
ja groups 37,794 37,766 36,493 8,841 8,841
F (excl inst) 29.1 29.0 29.6 14.5 14.1
Notes: Sample includes monthly observations Jan 1999 - Mar 2008 of all passenger cars and light trucks age 0-25.
Model*age xed e¤ects, monthly time dummies, and model year dummies are included. Column (1) is the primary
specication from Table 3, column (1). Nest share is the share of all vehicles in the same class. Column (2) excludes
hybrid vehicles. Column (3) excludes greenvehicles. Columns (4) and (5) are limited to a subsample for which
additional vehicle characteristics are available, (wheelbase, engine displacement, horsepower, torque, traction control,
ABS brakes, and stability control) and column (5) controls for those characteristics. Standard errors are robust and
clustered by ja (model * age).
Table 11: Retail and Wholesale Prices
Dependent variable: Vehicle price
Specication (1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary Common sample Retail prices Retail only
Gjat -0.61 -0.75 -0.60 -0.57
[ =] ( 0.07 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.07 )
ln(market share) -2372 -2921 -2273 -2174
[ (1  )=] ( 723 ) ( 915 ) ( 743 ) ( 719 )
ln(nest share) -1807 -1415 -1775 -2100
[-=] ( 655 ) ( 742 ) ( 613 ) ( 631 )
Observations 1,053,058 475,336 475,336 476,080
ja groups 37,794 19,039 19,039 19,095
F (excl inst) 29.1 26.4 29.6 30.3
Notes: Sample includes monthly observations Jan 1999 - Mar 2008 of all passenger cars and light trucks age 0-25.
Model*age xed e¤ects, monthly time dummies, and model year dummies are included. Column (1) is the primary
specication from Table 3, column (1). Nest share is the share of all vehicles in the same class. Column (2) is limited
to the sample with both wholesale and retail used vehicle prices available. Column (3) uses the retail price data in
the common sample. Column (4) uses the retail price data with the full sample. Standard errors are robust and
clustered by ja (model * age).
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Table 12: Measurement Error
Dependent variable: Vehicle price
Specication (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Primary Lag G 1 mo Lag G 1 yr G average GPM G xed VMT
Gjat -0.61 -0.66 -0.66 -0.57 -0.62
[ =] ( 0.07 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.10 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.07 )
ln(market share) -2372 -2684 -2643 128 -2395
[ (1  )=] ( 723 ) ( 778 ) ( 920 ) ( 328 ) ( 684 )
ln(nest share) -1807 -1729 -1739 -1474 -1795
[-=] ( 655 ) ( 697 ) ( 696 ) ( 381 ) ( 664 )
Observations 1,053,058 1,053,058 1,053,058 1,053,058 1,053,058
ja groups 37,794 37,794 37,794 37,794 37,794
Cragg-Donald stat 29.1 14.2 9.9 41.0 16.5
Notes: Sample includes monthly observations Jan 1999 - Mar 2008 of all passenger cars and light trucks age 0-25.
Model*age xed e¤ects, monthly time dummies, and model year dummies are included. Column (1) is the primary
specication from Table 3, column (1). Nest share is the share of all vehicles in the same class. Columns (2)-(5)
instrument for Gjat with a value similar computed with some change. The instruments in columns (2) and (3) are
computed with gas prices lagged by 1 month and 1 year respectively. Column (4) uses the average gallons per mile
within a model*age. Column (5) assumes that all vehicles travel 12,000 miles per year. Standard errors are robust
and clustered by ja (model * age).
Table 13: Welfare E¤ects of Behavioral Feebate
E¤ects on New Vehicle Market
Feebate Pivot (MPG) 19.0
Quantity Above Pivot (%) 31.0
Quantity Below Pivot (%) -49.8
Average MPG 2.36
Welfare E¤ects, Excluding CO2
CSc: Change in Choice Consumer Surplus ($/person) -17.0
CSb: Change in Internality ($/person) -32.1
CSh: Change in Hedonic Consumer Surplus ($/person) 15.1
Gasoline and CO2 E¤ects
Gasoline Use (gallons/person) -37.5
Gasoline Costs ($/person) -82.1
CO2 Emissions (metric tons/person) -0.3
Climate Damages ($NPV/person) -7.6
"Notes: All welfare and CO2 numbers are net present values over the lifetime of the vehicle, for a counterfactual
policy that a¤ects one model year of sales. Marginal damages of CO2 are assumed to be $30 per metric ton. Change
in choice consumer surplus also includes the recycled net revenues from the feebate policy."
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A Appendices (Not For Publication)
A.1 Appendix 1: Dynamic Consumer Choice Model
In this Appendix, we derive our static discrete choice model from a more realistic model of the consumers
decision problem. In the process, we clarify and discuss the assumptions required for our estimator to be
consistent.
We build on the approach of Stolyarov (2002) in writing down the consumers dynamic durable goods
choice problem. The consumer maximizes an indirect utility function U = w + uijat(; ; ), which is
additively separable in "vehicle utility" uijat and consumption of a numeraire good. As in the text, consumer
i chooses a vehicle in period t from the set JA of possible model-by-age combinations. Owning vehicle ja
at time t forces expected one-period gasoline expenditures eGjat and gives one-period utility ow e ijat. This
individual-specic utility ow is the sum of average utility e jat and an individual taste error e"ijat. In the
next year, where utility ows are discounted by factor , the consumer will have the choice to sell the vehicle,
incurring transaction cost ja, or hold it.
In the body of the paper, we assumed risk neutrality, homogeneous  and , and that G does not vary
within-jat. Under these assumptions, the consumer maximizes the following Bellman Equation:
max
JA
uijat =  pjat    eGjat + e ijat
+ max
n
max
KA
fuikat+1g+ pj(a+1)(t+1)   ja; uij;a+1;t+1 + pj;a+1;t+1
o
(22)
Most analyses of durable goods markets, including Stolyarov (2002) and the literature following Rust
(1985), assume that the market is stationary: the prices, quantities, and attributes of the choice set remain
constant. This is useful for us because it prevents us from needing to make a series of other, potentially
more complex assumptions about how consumers believe the market will evolve.
Assumption: Stationarity: E[pjat+s] = pjat and E[sjat+s] = sjat, 8s and E[JAt+s] = JAt
Stolyarov (2002) shows that if the market is stationary, the consumers decision rule is also stationary:
she will purchase her preferred vehicle, hold that preferred vehicle as it ages until the utility gain from
replacing the vehicle outweighs the transaction cost ja, and then replace with the same preferred vehicle.
We denote the optimal holding period as  jat. For expositional ease, this is assumed to be constant within
the set of consumers that purchase vehicle ja at time t in equilibrium. The vehicle utility from buying vehicle
ja is:
uijat =  pjat +
 1X
s=0
s

 eGj;a+s;t+s + e ij;a+s;t+s+  (pj;a+;t+   ja) + uija(t+) (23)
The rst line captures the utility from paying for the vehicle and then fueling and using it over  years.
The rst term on the second line captures the discounted utility from selling it, including the transaction
cost. The last term reects the fact that, in a stationary market, the consumer will re-purchase the same
vehicle - and realize the same utility - over the next  years.
We can be more specic about the resale price by assuming that consumers expect the prices predicted
by the nested logit model. Recall that this gives:
pjat =
1

 (ln sjat   ln s0t)  Gjat +  ln s(j=n)at +  jat (24)
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Substituting this into the utility function, we have:
uijat =  pjat +
 1X
s=0
s

 eGj;a+s;t+s + e ij;a+s;t+s
+
 
 (ln sj;a+;t+   ln s0;t+ ) +  ln s(j=n);a+;t+ +
L 1 a X
s=0
s

  eGj;a++s;t++s + e j;a++s;t++s  ja
!
+ uijat+
=  pjat +
L 1 aX
s=0
s

 eGj;a+s;t+s + e j;a+s;t+s+  1X
s=0
e"ij;a+s;t+s
+ 
  (ln sj;a+;t+   ln s0;t+ ) +  ln s(j=n);a+;t+   ja+ uijat+ (25)
The rst term of the last line reects that part of the vehicles resale value depends on future market
share. The last term generates an innite sum of utilities. We now omit it, as it simply scales nominal utility
by an amount that depends on the consumers time horizon. Note that the introduction of a constant vehicle
death probability is simply equivalent to decreasing the discount factor.
By specically dening some of the terms from our apparently-static utility function, we can now show
that our dynamic model maps into this utility function. This allows us to make explicit the assumptions
required for our estimator to be consistent in a dynamic world. Recall that our apparently-static utility
function was:
uijat = (w   pjat)  Gjat +  jat + ijat (26)
We map the "dynamic" variables into the "static" variables with the following equations:
Gjat =
L 1X
s=0
s eGj;a+s;t+s (27)
 jat =
L 1X
s=0
se j;a+s;t+s +    (ln sj;a+;t+   ln s0t+ ) +  ln s(j=n)at   ja
"ijat =
 1X
s=0
se"ij;a+s;t+s
The rst line indicates that, as before, we can dene Gjat as the discounted sum of future fuel costs.
The second line now captures both the consumers utility from using the vehicle and the resale value and
transaction cost. The third line is the individual-specic error term, which we assume takes the "nested
logit" structure.
For the dynamic decision to simplify directly to the static model, the critical assumption is therefore
that consumers believe that the market is stationary. For our estimator based on the static model to be
unbiased given the true dynamic nature of consumersdecisions is of course a weaker requirement than that
the models be identical. In principle, simplifying to the static model can introduce any additional error, as
long as that error is uncorrelated with Gjat. This means that the critical assumption from above, that
consumers believe that the market is stationary, could in principle be weakened. For our estimator to be
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unbiased, consumers need not believe that the market is stationary, but they must believe that any "non-
stationarities" - changes in prices and characteristics of future products - are uncorrelated with changes in
gasoline prices. The implications of this assumption are discussed in the text, and in particular, section 7
provides evidence that our results are not sensitive to this assumption.
A.2 Appendix 2: Data
In this Data Appendix, we describe in detail the construction and cleaning of vehicle price and quantity
data, vehicle attributes, and future expected gasoline prices. We then detail how the data from multiple
sources was merged into one dataset.
A.2.1 Vehicle Price and Quantity Data
Vehicle Prices The Manheim dataset consists of observations of individual vehicles put up for sale at a
Manheim auction. We keep observations that resulted in a sale and for which we have a valid VIN number
that can be matched to our other data sets. Prices are adjusted for ination, logged, then used as the left
hand side variable in a xed e¤ects regression containing odometer reading and its square, dummies for
vehicle condition code, region of sale, type of sale (open to the public or restricted to certain buyers), and
auction type (physical in-lane auction or internet sale). The xed e¤ects are model by model year by year by
month. A single logged price is predicted for each xed e¤ect, assuming a vehicle with an odometer reading
predicted using the NHTS data, in goodcondition, sold in the Midwest, in a sale open to all buyers, in a
physical auction. These predicted values are then exponentiated to obtain monthly price estimates for that
model and model year.
The JD Power dataset consists of monthly summaries of individual dealer-to-customer transactions by
vehicle (at the level of a VIN prex) and transaction type (cash, lease, or nanced). Mean monthly prices
are adjusted for customer rebates and any di¤erence between the negotiated trade-in price and the trade-in
vehicles actual resale value.
Mean new and used vehicle prices for selected model years are shown in Appendix Figure A1. Although
new vehicle prices are substantially higher than prices of used vehicles sold early in the vehicles life, this
discontinuity will not a¤ect our analysis since all regressions are run with model by age xed e¤ects.
All regressions are weighted by the number of observations in the price data sets. This assigns higher
weight to vehicles for which a more precise estimate of price is available, and a smaller weight to exotic
vehicles that may vary substantially in price for reasons other than gas costs. However, since prices are taken
from two di¤erent data sets, we scale the weights on new vehicles so that the mean weight for new vehicles
and one year old vehicles is equal. Our results are qualitatively similar without this reweighting, and when
new vehicles are excluded from the analysis.
Quantities Vehicle quantities are annual snapshots of registration data collected for all new and used
vehicles in the entire United States by R.L. Polk. We assume that the quantity in any month is equal to the
registered quantity in the July snapshot. Since registrations are typically renewed annually or biennially,
there may be slight di¤erences between the registration snapshots and the actual quantities of a model in
use at the time. New vehicles are a particular problem in that not all vehicles are registered by July of the
model year. Since very few vehicles are retired in the rst few years after the model year, we set the quantity
in the model year equal to the quantity one year later. Total registered quantities for selected model years
are shown in Appendix Figure A2.
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A.2.2 Vehicle Attributes
Fuel Economy Since 1975, the EPA has employed a consistent test, called a dynamometer test, to
measure fuel economy.29 In 1985, the EPA introduced adjustment factors to these tests to account for an
"in-use shortfall," the di¤erence between fuel economy computed under laboratory conditions and the actual
fuel economy that the EPA measured for drivers on the road. The "Adjusted" values were computed for City
and Highway MPG by multiplying the Laboratory values by 0.9 and 0.78, respectively, and these Adjusted
values were the ones made public for consumers for model years 1985-2007. To construct a Composite fuel
economy rating from the reported MPGs between 1985 and 2007, inclusive, the EPA originally took the
weighted harmonic mean of City and Highway New Adjusted MPG ratings, with 55% and 45% weights,
respectively.
During the past several years, the EPA has again adjusted its fuel economy calculation to account for
changes in driving patterns since 1984. For model year 2005-2008 vehicles, these New Adjusted values are:
New Adjusted City = 1=(0:003259 + 1:1805=Lab City) (28)
New Adjusted Highway = 1=(0:001376 + 1:3466=Lab Highway)
To construct the revised Composite rating, the EPA changed these weights for the harmonic mean to
57% and 43% for City and Highway, respectively. In recent years, these revised ratings were the ones made
public to consumers. The EPA also retroactively changed its fuel economy ratings for old vehicles, now
assuming that the changes between original and new adjustments actually occurred linearly between 1986
and 2005.
We construct two measures of fuel economy, one which should reect consumersbest guess at MPG
based on information publicly available at the time, and one which reects analystsbest guess in 2008 at
what each vehicles fuel economy actually was. For 1985-2008, we use the (retroactively phased in) New
Adjusted EPA methodology in our primary specication, to reect analystsbest guess at the true value
of MPG. Using the alternative construction of MPG - consumers best guess - does not statistically or
substantively change the results, giving b = 0:63.
Greene, et al. (2007) report that fuel economy in used cars degrades at an average of 0.07 MPG per year.
We further adjust both measures of MPG to account for this. The distribution of fuel economy constructed
for our primary specication (in miles per gallon) is shown for selected model years in Appendix Figure A3.
Other Attributes In selected specications, we use data on vehicle characteristics, including horsepower,
weight, wheelbase, torque, ABS brakes, traction control, and stability control. For all model years, these
data are from the Wards Automotive Yearbook. These were purchased in electronic form from Wards for
model years beginning with 1995. We use curb weight as the measure of weight.
Vehicle Class Vehicle class data is from the EPA when available. When EPA data is not available, we use
vehicle characteristics to determine vehicle class consistent with EPAs denition. Cars are divided into two-
seaters (which seat only two adults) and sedans, which are further subdivided into minicompact, subcompact,
compact, mid-size, and large based on interior volume. Trucks are divided into pickup trucks, sport utility
vehicles, minivans, and vans based on their intended purpose. Pickup trucks and SUVs are further subdivided
into standard and small based on gross vehicle weight rating, but we ignore this distinction, as vehicles may
be highly substitutable across these categories. An additional class of light trucks, special purpose vehicle, is
not used in recent years but includes pickup trucks, SUVs, and minivans. These are manually recoded into
the most appropriate class.
29The information in this and the following paragraph is from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2008).
We acquried the EPA adjusted and unadjusted test data for 1975-2008 directly from researchers at Oak Ridge National
Laboratory.
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A.2.3 Future Gasoline Costs
Computation of discounted future gasoline costs Gjat requires the expected gas price, expected vehicle miles
traveled, and probability that the vehicle is still functional for all future time periods. We outline the
computation of each of these.
Note that a vehicle of a given model year typically begins being sold in September of the previous calendar
year. The gasoline prices used to construct the instrument Gj0(t a) were thus the September-August mean
gasoline prices.
Gasoline Prices Our source of gasoline price data is the US Energy Information Administration (EIA).
We use US City Average Motor Gasoline Retail Price for all types of gasoline, which are available on a
monthly basis from Table 9.4 of the EIAs Monthly Energy Review.
Oil Futures We acquired the entire history of futures prices for Light Sweet Crude Oil (LSCO) on the
NYMEX and Intercontinental Exchange. Oil futures prices are transformed into gasoline price expectations
in constant 2005 dollars using the following approach.
First, futures prices are denominated in future dollars at the delivery date, meaning that they must be
discounted to current dollars using a measure of ination expectation. Our measure of ination expectations
is from the di¤erence in yield rates between standard and ination-protected (TIPS) treasury bonds, available
from http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm#fn14. We use the ve year bonds for futures
with maturities zero to six years in the future, the seven year bonds for maturities six to eight years in the
future, and the ten year bonds for maturities more than eight years in the future. Before the TIPS bonds
were sold in 2003, we use ination expectations of 2%. This is approximately consistent with actual observed
ination over the period 1998-2002.
Second, all data are deated into real July 2005 dollars. Third, these constant-dollar oil price expectations
are converted into gasoline price expectations. This is done using the slope and intercept coe¢ cient estimates
from a linear regression of historical national city average retail gasoline prices on spot LSCO prices. Among
other things, this assumes that renersmargins will be constant over time.
Finally, to model expectations for periods beyond the last futures contract settlement date observed at
each time t, we use a simple model of mean-reverting expectations, where deviations at time t from a mean
of $1.50 per gallon decay exponentially over years s:
E[gt+s] = 1:50 + (gt   1:50)  es
Re-arranging this equation, the mean reversion parameter  is estimated from the post-1991 observed
futures data using the following linear specication:
log jEgs   1:50j = log jgt   150j+ (t  s)
The estimation gives b =  0:057, meaning that the market expected recent gasoline price increases to
decay back to $1.50 per gallon at 5.7 percent per year.
Ination Adjustment All vehicles prices and gasoline prices are deated using the BLS consumer price
index series for All Items, Urban (CUUR0000SA0), available from ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/time.series/cu/cu.data.1.AllItems.
We use real dollars for the average CPI in 2005, which is almost exactly equivalent to real July 2005 dollars.
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Survival Probability In our base specication, the probability that a vehicle is still functional in a
future time period is estimated using a probit model with grouped data. The outcome variable is the
number of vehicles of a model and model year registered next year, qja(t+1), out of the number of vehicles
registered today, qjat, from the R.L. Polk data. The estimation of survival probabilities recovers coe¢ cients
on age dummies, model year and its square, vehicle class dummies, rm dummies, and rm-specic linear age
trends. The sample used in the estimation is the same as the sample used in our discrete choice model. The
estimation coe¢ cients are used to predict a series of probabilities that each vehicle in the data set survives
to time t+ 1 conditional on surviving to time t, for current and future values of t. These are multiplied to
compute probabilities that each vehicle survives an additional s years beyond its current age, for all positive
s up to L = 25. This is the relevant probability that enters the computation of Gjat. Due to scarce data for
vehicles older than 25 years, we set the probability that a vehicle survives past age 25 equal to zero. The
trends in the data set suggest this is not an unreasonable assumption.
Vehicle Miles Traveled We do not observe average Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT) for all vehicles on
the road. Instead, we use microdata from the National Household Travel Survey (NHTS) for 2001. These
data allow us to predict the expectation of a vehicles VMT conditional on its characteristics. There are two
possible measures of VMT included in the data: consumersstated VMT and recorded odometer readings.
Because we are interested in consumersexpectations of VMT, we use the stated VMT. Appendix Figure
A4 illustrates these data by showing average annualized VMT as a function of vehicle age.
Accounting for Elasticity on the Intensive Margin While our primary specication of Gjat
assumes that the elasticity of vehicle miles traveled with respect to gasoline prices is negligible, we also
present an alternative specication that accounts for this elasticity. We now detail how this alternative
specication was derived. The model must capture two e¤ects. First, changes in VMT change total expected
gasoline expenditures Gjat. Second, the utility from vehicle ownership and use  jat also depends on VMT:
the utility from owning a vehicle and driving it 12,000 miles per year is di¤erent than the utility of owning
a vehicle and driving it 11,500 miles per year.
We adopt estimates of short run elasticity of gasoline demand from three recent papers. Hughes, Knittel,
and Sperling (2007) nd that between 2001 and 2006, the short run elasticity was between -.034 and -.077.
Small and Van Dender (2007) nd that with covariates at their 1997-2001 levels (the latest years in their study
period), the short run elasticity is -.022. Davis and Kilian (2009) use an instrumental variables procedure
identied o¤ of state-level changes in gasoline taxes and estimate a short run elasticity of -0.46. We assume
an elasticity of -0.5 to conservatively overstate the potential e¤ects of intensive margin elasticity.
We generate expected VMT at any possible gasoline price, using the following constant elasticity formula:
log(mjas) = ( 0:5)  log(gs) + 0 (29a)
0 = log(mja;2001)  ( 0:5)  log(g2001) (29b)
Appendix Figure A5 shows a vehicle owners demand for VMT. In 2001, gas prices are g2001 and con-
sumers choose VMT mja;2001 (g2001), giving total annual gasoline costs in the shaded rectangle bounded by
those two values. At time s with higher gasoline prices gs, consumers reduce VMT to mjas(gs). The new
annual gasoline cost is now the unshaded rectangle bounded by gs=fjas and mjas. The values of Gjat in our
alternative specication are calculated from these adjusted VMT values mjas.
The VMT demand curve also provides insight into how changes in VMT change consumersutility from
vehicle use. The consumers total utility from vehicle use is the area under the demand curve. As gasoline
prices increase from g2001 to gs, this total utility decreases by the area of the shaded trapezoid in Appendix
Figure A5. Summing this over the future years of the vehicles life, we have an adjustment denoted Ijat. For
simplicity, we assume a linear demand curve between mja;2001 and mjas in computing the utility change:
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Ijat =
t+(L 1 a)X
s=t+1
 f 1jas  (g2001 + gs)  (mja;2001  mjas)  jas  s t (30)
The sign of the variable Ijat is dened such that as the utility from vehicle use decreases and utility
decreases, Ijat increases. Because Ijat is in measured in dollar terms, a one dollar increase in Ijat should
reduce willingness to pay for the vehicle by one dollar. In our alternative specication that accounts for
intensive margin elasticity, we move Ijat to the left hand side and estimate equation (9) with pjat + Ijat as
the dependent variable.
A.2.4 Data Construction and Coverage
Our data are merged by partial VIN number using the Complete Prex File, a product sold by R.L. Polk.
This allows us to use a common set of vehicle names and descriptions throughout the data set. Wards
and EPA data do not contain VIN information, so these were matched by name. Each dataset provides
information at di¤erent levels of detail: one dataset may include separate information for a two wheel drive
versus a four wheel drive version of a model, while another includes only mean information on that model.
We have collapsed the dataset to the most disaggregated level that is feasible given the data constraints. In
this collapsing process, prices are estimated with number of observations as weights, quantities are summed,
MPG is averaged using the harmonic mean, and other characteristics are averaged using an arithmetic mean.
The aim of the dataset is to include consumersentire vehicle choice sets for every month between 1999
and 2008. This includes all light duty vehicles (cars and light trucks) available to the public. Due to data
constraints, we had to drop parts of the choice set; this is not uncommon in discrete choice models where
data on small parts of the choice set may not be available. In particular, we dropped vehicles for which we
are missing one or more of the required data sources: prices, quantities, or fuel economy. Vehicles with model
years before 1983 were also dropped, as we can only match VIN numbers to a vehicle name after 1983. We
drop vehicles which do not use gasoline or are not part of the set of substitutable passenger vehicles, such as
delivery vehicles and motor homes. Finally, because we use xed e¤ects, a small number of ja vehicles with
prices observed only at one t must be dropped from the estimation. Appendix Figure A6 shows the data
coverage.
A.3 Appendix 3: Predicted Substitution Patterns
This appendix presents a "reality check" of the substitution patterns predicted by our parameter estimates
in the nested logit model. Table 14 presents example substitution patterns between new vehicles in the 2007
choice set predicted by the nested logit model for the two most popular vehicles in the compact, SUV, and
pickup vehicle classes. The table shows the own-price and cross-price elasticities computed by increasing
the price of all submodels within a given new model by ve percent. Instead of using the analytical nested
logit cross-price elasticities, these are generated while holding constant the quantities of all used vehicles and
of the outside option, using a modication of the Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) contraction mapping
procedure.30
30The modied contraction is:
ep0jat = epjat   1


ln sjat   ln bsjat(b; b; b ; b; epjat; Fjat) (31)
In this equation, ep0 indicates the used vehicle prices to be used in the subsequent iteration of the contraction
mapping. Note that if the prices of all substitutes are unchanged, the procedure would immediately solve for epjat =
pjat, the intially-observed equilibrium used vehicle prices, as the b jat were themselves implied by the initial market
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The table shows, for example, that the Honda Civic had 325 thousand new model sales in 2007. If its
price were increased by 5 percent, quantity demanded would decrease by 6.15  0.05 = 31 percent. Quantity
demanded of the Toyota Corolla would increase by 0.18  0.05 = 0.9 percent. This table brings to light
the substitution patterns implied by the nested logit specication. If the price of a vehicle increases, the
quantities of all vehicles in other nests change by essentially the same percent, after accounting for small
changes in used vehicle prices. Cross-price elasticities are higher within the same nest, depending on the
value of the substitution parameters , but are e¤ectively the same for all substitutes within the nest.
We can similarly compute the aggregate price elasticity of demand in the new vehicle market by increasing
the prices of all new vehicles by 10 percent and resimulating quantities, holding constant the market shares
of each used vehicle. Predicted 2007 new vehicle sales drop from 14.16 million to 7.23 million. This secant
calculation gives an overall new vehicle market price elasticity of -4.89.
An additional approach to testing the sensibility of these estimated substitution parameters is to back
out the implied markups that auto manufacturers would be applying to their vehicles if they are playing a
static Nash multi-product pricing game.31 As shown in Table 14, the implied markups for our six example
new vehicles range from 9.3 percent to 18.4 percent, or around $2600 per vehicle.
If anything, the estimated b and b are high and low, respectively: relative to our priors, consumers are
estimated to be slightly more price elastic and somewhat more willing to substitute across vehicle classes. To
test whether this a¤ects the results, we experimented with alternative specications that xed lower values
of  and higher values of  in the second stage of equation (9). Both of these types of changes produce
estimates of  that are further away from unity.
equilibrium with no feebate.
This equation can be derived from the original BLP contraction mapping by subsituting in for their average utility
jat:
jat =  pjat   Gjat +  jat
Given that Gjat and  jat are constant throughout the procedure, solving for a set of  values that equate observed
with predicted shares is equivalent to solving for a set of equilibrium used vehicle prices.
31See Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) or Petrin (2002) for details on computing the markups implied by
estimated substitution patterns in the static Nash pricing game.
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Appendix Figures
Figure A1: Vehicle Prices
Figure A2: Vehicle Quantities
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Figure A3: Fuel Economy Ratings of Vehicles Registered in 2007
Figure A4: Vehicle Miles Traveled By Vehicle Age
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Figure A5: Intensive Margin
Figure A6: Data Coverage
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Appendix Table
Table 14: Predicted New Vehicle Own and Cross-Price Elasticities
Vehicle Quantity Civic Corolla Equinox F-Series Pathnder Ram
Civic 325 -6.15 0.14 0.03 0.20 0.02 0.09
Corolla 300 0.18 -5.30 0.03 0.20 0.02 0.09
Equinox 77 0.13 0.11 -7.09 0.20 0.03 0.09
F-Series 360 0.14 0.11 0.03 -8.08 0.02 0.12
Pathnder 38 0.13 0.11 0.04 0.20 -8.73 0.09
Ram 173 0.14 0.11 0.03 0.26 0.02 -7.81
Markup (%) 14.6 18.4 12.8 12.3 9.3 10.6
Notes: Values shown are the elasticity of demand for the vehicle in the row name with respect to
the price of the vehicle in the column name. To generate this table, the price of all submodels of
the given model were increased by ve percent, and the market shares of all other new vehicles
were re-simulated. The simulation adjusts the prices of individual used vehicles and the price level
of all new vehicles so as to hold constant the market shares of used vehicles and of the outside
option. Quantities are 2007 new model sales in 1,000s. Markups are those implied by a static Nash
multiproduct pricing game.
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